Archive for the ‘Insurance & Reinsurance’ Category

Home, Cottage and Recreational Property Litigation

Friday, July 22nd, 2011

For many people the most valuable asset they own is their home, cottage or other recreational property.

Heydary Hamilton PC can advise and represent homeowners, cottage owners and other property owners in connection with claims and disputes arising in connection with home, cottage or other residential or recreational property.

Whether such claim or dispute arises in connection with:

  • the design, construction, repair or demolition of property
  • damage to the property
  • fire, smoke, flood, mould or infestation
  • homeowners insurance claims
  • insurance coverage for third party claims
  • injuries occurring on the property, including slip and fall, dog bite and owner or family injuries sustained on the property
  • occupiers’ liability
  • warranty coverage
  • purchase and sale issues
  • alcohol liability and host issues
  • swimming pool claims
  • mortgage, foreclosure and other finance issues
  • easements and licenses
  • ownership disputes
  • partition and sale
  • condominium issues
  • maintenance fees, levies and the like
  • management and operation of the property
  • products liability
  • neighbours, other property owners or associations
  • utilities and suppliers of services
  • trespassers
  • use of the property
  • failure of insurers to defend owners
  • boundary disputes or adverse possession
  • restrictive covenants
  • leasing, sublet or assignment issues
  • tax assessment
  • valuations
  • timeshare issues
  • environmental issues
  • homeowner and cottage owner’s association issues
  • expropriation and eminent domain issues
  • dilapidation and demolition
  • wills and estates issues
  • disputes as to title
  • real estate agents or brokers

Heydary Hamilton PC can provide effective and efficient legal services in connection with home, cottage and recreational properties.

David Alderson, LL.B, LL.M 

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D.

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial and other litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

 

Injured on Vacation

Friday, July 22nd, 2011

Canadians love to travel. 

In particular, Statistics Canada recently reported that travel by Canadians to foreign countries included these top fifteen destinations: United States, United Kingdom, Mexico, France, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Spain, China, Hong Kong, Japan, Switzerland and Austria.

Travel to the USA included these top fifteen destinations: New York, Michigan, Washington, California, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Illinois, Florida, Texas, New Jersey, Wisconsin, Maine and Oregon.

But accidents sometimes occur to Ontario residents while they are travelling to or from, visiting, working or vacationing in other provinces or countries. 

Examples of Vacation Accidents

Road, Rail and Air Accidents and Injuries
Bus Accidents and Injuries
Water Accidents and Injuries – Beach and Swimming Pool Accidents
Cruise Accidents, Injury and Illness
Maritime Accidents – Boat and Jet-Ski Injuries
Boating Accidents, including Small Craft and Sailing Accidents
Water Sports Injuries – Diving, Scuba and Snowboarding Injuries
Winter Sports Accidents – Snowmobile, Ski, Snowboard and Climbing Accidents
Equestrian Activities – Riding and Equestrian Sports
Spectator Injury 
Amusement Park Ride Accidents
Victim of Assault or other Criminal Activity
Food Poisoning and Illness

Suppose that during a vacation or while working outside Ontario or abroad, injury, harm or loss was caused to you or a member of your family by one or more of the following: tour operators, travel agents, ship and boat owners and operators and cruise lines, airlines, hotels, restaurants, sports venues, amusement and theme parks, entertainment venues, or ski and snowboard resort owners and operators.  Or you want to present a claim to your travel insurers for injury, death, harm or loss caused during a holiday or travel excursion.

Claims by Ontario residents from events arising in other provinces or other countries often involve complex issues of jurisdiction (where the lawsuit must be started) and questions as to which country’s laws should apply. We can provide an opinion as to whether or not the laws of Ontario apply to your situation, and whether or not the courts in Ontario have jurisdiction to hear your case or whether you must go to a court in a place other than Ontario to seek damages or other remedies. 

In cases where you are required to pursue your accident claim in a province other than Ontario or in the country where it occurred, we cannot provide legal advice or representation, but we can be retained to assist you in the choice and appointment of a lawyer to handle your case in the country where the accident occurred. 

Please note that it is important to seek and obtain legal advice of a competent lawyer in the appropriate jurisdiction as soon as possible, since time limitation periods to give notice of claims and to commence legal proceedings will vary across Canada and throughout the world and in some cases these time limits are very short.

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D. 

David Alderson,  LL.B, LL.M 

Admitted in Ontario, Canada and New York, USA.
Also admitted (but not practicing) in Bermuda, England and Wales.
Practiced with Legal Consultants in Dubai.

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial and other litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

 

City of Mississauga Not Responsible for Icy Sidewalk

Thursday, March 31st, 2011

Under section 44(9) of the Municipal Act, a municipality is not liable for personal injury caused by snow or ice on a sidewalk “…except in cases of gross negligence”.

Douglas Billings slipped on an icy sidewalk in Mississauga following a major snow and ice storm.  He sued the City of Mississauga.  In court, he alleged that the City had failed to follow its own snow removal policy, under which snow and ice is to be cleared within 36 hours of a storm.  He pointed to the fact that the sidewalk where the accident took place had been in a dangerous condition for over 100 hours, and that the City relied exclusively on unionized workers (as opposed to independent contractors), who were not required to work overtime and weekends.

Mr. Billings’s case was dismissed at trial, so he took it to the Ontario Court of Appeal.  The trial judge had found that the storm in April of 2003 was an extraordinary event.  That conclusion was supported by an Environment Canada survey, which ranked the storm second on its list of the top 10 Canadian weather stories of that year.

The trial judge had carefully reviewed the City’s systems, personnel, and policies for dealing snowstorms.  He concluded that the City’s response to the April, 2003 storm was “completely reasonable”.  The Court of Appeal agreed, and dismissed the appeal.

The standard of gross negligence that has to be met in order to succeed in a claim of this kind is extremely high.  The case illustrates the difficulty that plaintiffs and their lawyers face in pursuing this kind of claim against a municipality.

The case is also interesting in that the court accepted the defendant’s assertion that a big snowstorm is an extraordinary event.  Municipalities often design their snow removal and storm water systems to handle a “100 year storm”, meaning that the systems are capable of dealing with precipitation that equals the volume and intensity of the biggest storm to hit the area in the last 100 years, based on historical weather records.  The writer, who has been practicing law for less than 100 years, has personally been involved in several lawsuits which involved “100 year” storms.  Record setting storms seem to have become the new normal, perhaps as a result of changes in weather patterns resulting from global warming.  Will the courts eventually hold that municipalities ought to take note of these changing conditions, and plan for storms that exceed the 100 year standard?

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D.

Link: Billings v. Mississauga (City), 2011 ONCA 247

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Court Sets Aside Insurance Company Release

Wednesday, March 9th, 2011

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice has determined that a release that an insurance adjuster obtained from an unsophisticated claimant is unconscionable and should be set aside. 

The plaintiff, Brandon Jones, was the driver of a motorcycle that was involved in a collision with a car driven by the defendant Jack Jenkins.  An adjuster for Mr. Jenkins’s insurer, ING Insurance Company of Canada, contacted Mr. Jones and asked him to make a proposal for settlement.  Mr. Jones submitted a proposal totalling some $241,000, broken down by different heads of damages such as disfigurement, pain and suffering, future pain, and future loss of employment. 

In a counter-proposal, the adjuster applied a $30,000 deductible to the general damages, then further reduced the offer on the basis that the plaintiff was 75% responsible for the accident.  The total amount of the counter-proposal was a little over $19,000. 

The adjuster’s letter setting out the counter-proposal confirmed that if the offer was accepted it would constitute a final release, and stated that Mr. Jones was free to consult a lawyer.  The plaintiff accepted the offer, but later changed his mind and brought an action against ING’s insured.  The defendant moved for summary judgment on the basis of the release.

Madam Justice MacPherson stated that the test for setting aside a release on the grounds of unconscionability is whether or not the transaction is so unconscionable that it requires the intervention of the court.  She applied a three-part test:

a)         There must be inequality of bargaining power arising out of the ignorance, need, or distress of the weaker party;

 b)         The plaintiff must establish that the stronger party has unconscientiously used its position of power to obtain an advantage; and

c)         It must be shown that the agreement reached is significantly unfair to the weaker party, or is so divergent from community     standards of commercial morality that it ought to be set aside.

The judge took note of the fact that the plaintiff was uneducated, unsophisticated, and unskilled with words.  He was in difficult circumstances at the time release was signed.  He had been unemployed for a year, and was living out of his car and relying on a food bank.  The birth of his third child was imminent, and his debts amounted to some $15,000.  It was unclear on the evidence how much knowledge the adjuster had regarding the plaintiff’s circumstances.

At the time of the release, the adjuster had access to medical information that he did not disclose to Mr. Jones indicating that the injuries were much more serious than the plaintiff understood.  The fact that information about the extent of the injuries was withheld from the plaintiff was described as by the judge as “significant”.  This was compounded by the fact that the $30,000 deductible is not applicable to general damages in excess of hundred thousand dollars, another fact that was not disclosed to Mr. Jones.

The factor most troubling to the judge was that the adjuster reduced the general damages and future economic loss claim by 75%, purportedly on the basis of the plaintiff’s contributory negligence.  There was no evidence, however, to support such a high level of contributory fault.

In conclusion, the judge found that there was inequality of bargaining power between the adjuster and Mr. Jones, and that the adjuster had used his position of power to achieve an advantage.  The agreement between the parties was so divergent from community standards of commercial morality that it was unconscionable, and had to be set aside.

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D.

Link: Jones v. Jenkins, CanLII – 2011 ONSC 1426 (CanLII)

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Ontario Court of Appeal requires Owners to Know their Tenants – Upholds Marijuana Insurance Exclusion

Thursday, March 3rd, 2011

The Court of Appeal for Ontario in Pietrangelo v Gore Mutual Insurance Company, 2011 ONCA 162 dismissed the plaintiffs’ appeal of the decision of the trial judge holding that an explosion which resulted in the total destruction of the plaintiffs’ house which was caused by the unknown (to the plaintiffs / insureds) use by the plaintiffs’ tenants of the plaintiffs’ house to “unlawfully produce cannabis resin” was excluded from the coverage in the plaintiffs’ policy of residential insurance they had placed with the defendant insurers. 

The insurers successfully relied upon the exclusion clause in the insurance policy “We do not insure…nor do we insure direct or indirect loss or damage…to dwellings…used in… processing [or] manufacture…of marijuana”.

The plaintiffs had submitted that the trial judge’s interpretation of the exclusion was in error because the word “use” (sic) in the clause was ambiguous and was not intended to apply, regardless of no knowledge and no involvement of the insureds; that the exclusion clause was “unjust or unreasonable” and section 151 of the Insurance Act should apply (that the clause exacts a penalty on the innocent insureds); and that the trial judge ignored the insurers’ Notice that the clause was in relation to “marijuana grow houses”. 

The Ontario Court of Appeal agreed with the trial judge that the exclusion clause was neither unjust or unreasonable; and whether or not the clause creates unfairness to the insured, there was a rational basis for its existence, including the legitimate business reasons relating to the ability to assess risk and set premiums. 

David Keith Alderson LL.B, LL.M

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Insurance Company Must Defend Parents Against Daughter’s Negligence Claim

Monday, February 14th, 2011

A daughter fell off the balcony of her parents’ home while visiting the family farm.  In a recent decision, the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that at the time of the accident, the daughter was not an “insured” under a farm insurance policy issued to the parents by the Lanark Mutual Insurance Company.  Lanark therefore had a duty to provide the parents with a defence to the negligence action that the daughter had brought against them.

The policy contained a standard clause in which the term “insured” was defined so as to include a relative while “living in the named insured’s household”.  Although a farm insurance policy will typically include liability coverage, these policies do not respond to a liability claim brought by one insured against another.

The judge who heard the duty to defend application found that some eight years before the accident, the daughter was driven from the family home at the age of 15 due to conflicts with her mother, serious religious and lifestyle differences with both parents, and the daughter’s disclosure that her father had been sexually abusing her for some five years.  Since she left home, she had lived what the court described as a “peripatetic existence”.  At the time of the accident, she was visiting the parental home in order to see her brother, who had returned to Canada from overseas, and she had been staying there for two and half weeks before she was injured.

The Court of Appeal stated that the purpose of the policy exclusion was to protect the insurer from collusive claims brought by individuals living together in a close relationship.  The appellate court agreed with the application judge that the term “household” describes a group of people living together in a family-like relationship which includes an element of intimacy or community.

The evidence supported the application judge’s conclusion that the parents did not enjoy that kind of relationship with their daughter, and that she was not “living in the named insured’s household” at the time of the accident.  She had not lived at home since she was either evicted by her parents or chose to leave home following her father’s sexual abuse conviction many years prior to the injury.  Her relationship with her parents had broken down completely when she first left home, she had established her own itinerant lifestyle, and she was not living in her parents’ household at the time of the accident.

It is interesting that the Court Of Appeal based its decision on the purpose of the exclusion clause, identified by the Court as the need to protect the insurance company against collusive claims brought by one family member against another.  Logic and fairness dictate that where the danger of collusion is nonexistent due to the breakdown of the family relationship, the need for the protection afforded to the insurer by the exclusion clause is no longer present.

 

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D.

Link: Tannahill v. Lanark Mutual Insurance Company, 2011 ONCA 123


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Insurance Coverage for Damage to Swimming Pool Through Pressure of Groundwater (Hydrostatic Uplift Pressure)

Thursday, February 10th, 2011

In reasons of the Honourable Justice Rosenberg delivered on February 8, 2011, the Ontario Court of Appeal in Cabell v The Personal Insurance Company. 2011 ONCA 105 granted a declaration that the plaintiffs have insurance coverage for the loss relating to their outdoor in-ground swimming pool as a result of hydrostatic uplift pressure due to build up of groundwater, causing the pool to lift out of the ground and to crack and setting aside the lower courts dismissal of the plaintiffs’ application.

The plaintiffs had purchased an endorsement to their property insurance for “Outdoor Inground Swimming Pools, Hot Tub, Spa and Sauna Coverage”. The application judge in the lower court held that the endorsement was not an independent part of the policy and that the Common Exclusions in the policy applied to the endorsement to exclude claims for “settling, expansion, contraction, moving, bulging, buckling or cracking of any insured property…” In doing so the application judge had rejected the plaintiffs’ submissions that only the exclusions expressly referred to in the endorsement applied.

The Court of Appeal disagreed.

The reasons provide guidance in the analysis of the interaction of the policy of insurance, its endorsements and their respective coverage and exclusion.  

A review of the principles of interpretation of insurance contracts is set forth in the reasons, including: the broad interpretation of coverage, the strict interpretation of clauses limiting coverage and construction of ambiguities against the insurer. But the court made it clear that the principles of interpretation cannot themselves create ambiguities – so that if an exclusion clause is clear, it is to be applied according to its terms, subject to the “nullification of coverage doctrine.” 

A detailed review of the Supreme Court of Canada decisions on this doctrine revealed contrasting views. As annunciated in the earliest decision, it is “simply a particular application of the broader rule of interpretation that in the case of ambiguity in an exclusion clause, the ambiguity is to be construed against the insurer”. Whereas more recently the same court has suggested “a different way of looking at the nullification of coverage doctrine; namely that it is an independent doctrine that applies even in the absence of an ambiguity”.

The Court of Appeal found that the only reasonable interpretation of the endorsement is that it at least amends the policy so that the part of the Common Exclusions (in the policy) referring to outdoor swimming pools does not apply. The court disagreed with the application judge’s refusal to apply the nullification doctrine because “there was no evidence that the effect of the Common Exclusions was to nullify coverage and no objective evidence as to the reasonable expectation of the parties”.

Instead the court reasoned that “It seems to me that a court is in a good position to determine what are the most obvious risks for which an ordinary homeowners’ policy is issued. If the court is able to determine on an objective basis that the insurer’s interpretation would render nugatory coverage for the most obvious risks which the endorsement is issued, a tactical burden shifts to the insurer. It will be for the insurer to show the effect of its interpretation would not nullify the coverage and would not be contrary to the reasonable expectations of the ordinary person as to the coverage purchased”.

Pool owners suffering this type of damages need legal advice on both their homeowner’s policy and any endorsements they have purchased.

 David Alderson LL.B., LL.M


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Ontario Court of Appeal Enforces Settlement of Disability Insurance Claim

Thursday, January 13th, 2011

Lynne Boulanger sued The Great West Life Assurance Company for disability benefits, damages for mental distress, and punitive and aggravated damages.  The case was settled at the conclusion of a one-day mediation conducted February 21, 2008, and both parties signed a written settlement agreement.

Notwithstanding the settlement agreement, Ms. Boulanger refused to sign a release or to consent to the dismissal of the action.  Since the settlement agreement did not specifically refer to her claims for mental distress and punitive and aggravated damages, she alleged that she had not agreed to settle those claims, and sought to continue her action with respect to the claims for mental distress and punitive damages.

On a motion by Great West Life to enforce the settlement agreement, Mr. Justice Maranger granted an order dismissing Ms. Boulanger’s action, and this order was upheld in a recent decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal took note of the fact that Ms. Boulanger was represented by counsel throughout the mediation, and that she personally signed the settlement agreement at the conclusion of the mediation.  After that agreement was executed, Ms. Boulanger accepted benefit payments provided to her by Great West Life under the terms of settlement.  Those benefits were never returned to Great West.

The settlement agreement expressly provided that Ms. Boulanger was to deliver “a release of all claims under this Policy up to today’s date”.  The settlement agreement did not exempt any of Ms. Boulanger’s claims for mental distress or for punitive damages.  According to the motions judge, the language of the settlement agreement was clear and left no room for doubt.  He stated that references to the release of “all claims” and to the “dismissal of the action” were unequivocal, and the Court of Appeal agreed.

In a second ground of appeal, Ms. Boulanger argued that counsel representing her at the mediation did not have her authority to agree to the terms of settlement.  Since there was no evidence that any limitation of authority regarding Ms. Boulanger’s lawyer was ever communicated to Great West Life or its representatives, and in fact there was no evidence that any such limitation existed, the Court of Appeal did not accept this ground of appeal.

On a motion to enforce the terms of a settlement agreement, the judge can refuse to enforce the agreement if he concludes that the circumstances of the case or the interests of justice demand it.  The motions judge declined to exercise his discretion in favour of the plaintiff, however, and the Court of Appeal refused to interfere with that decision.  The appeal was therefore dismissed.

Under the terms of the settlement agreement, Ms. Boulanger was called upon to execute a release of all claims under the insurance policy in a form “reasonably satisfactory to counsel for both sides”.  Counsel agreed on a form of release, but Ms. Boulanger repeatedly declined to sign it.  Mr. Justice Maranger refused the defendant’s request for an order enforcing the parts of the settlement agreement requiring a release from the plaintiff, and Great West submitted a cross-appeal from this portion of the motion judge’s decision.

The motion judge did not provide any reasons for his decision to refuse enforcement of the release provisions of the settlement agreement.  Given his conclusions regarding the enforceability of the settlement agreement, the Court of Appeal concluded that Great West was entitled to relief concerning the release.

The Court of Appeal did not order Ms. Boulanger to sign a release, however.  Instead, it varied the motion judge’s order by adding a paragraph stating that the dismissal of the action was an absolute bar to any subsequent proceedings by the plaintiff against the defendant, or by the plaintiff against any entity that could claim contribution or indemnity from Great West with respect to the claims raised in the action.

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D.

Link: Boulanger v. Great West Life Assurance Company, 2011 ONCA 20


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

The Insurer Under an Auto Policy Issued in the U.S. Has to Arbitrate Loss Transfer Dispute in Ontario

Tuesday, November 23rd, 2010

Section 275 of the Insurance Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I–8, provides that when an automobile insurer has paid no-fault benefits to its own insured, the company is entitled to recover those benefits from the insurer of the at-fault driver.  Indemnification for the no-fault benefits is to be apportioned between the insurers based on the respective degree of fault of each insurer’s driver.  Section 275(4) states that if the insurers cannot agree on indemnification, the dispute is to be resolved by means of arbitration under the Arbitrations Act, S.O. 1991, c. 17.

In a case that was recently argued before the Court of Appeal, the insurer for the at-fault driver resisted arbitration on the grounds that its policy was not issued in Ontario, arguing that the loss transfer scheme established by section 275 of the Ontario Insurance Act was therefore inapplicable.

An Ontario resident was injured in a car accident in North Carolina.  Primmum Insurance Company, an Ontario insurer, paid statutory accident benefits under its standard Ontario auto policy.  The at-fault driver was insured under a policy issued by Allstate Insurance in North Carolina.

When Allstate refused to participate in arbitration, Primmum brought an application to the Superior Court.  The application Judge concluded that the Ontario loss transfer scheme did apply to Allstate, but on appeal, Allstate argued that section 275 of the Insurance Act cannot apply to insurance contracts between parties who are not resident in Ontario respecting losses that occur outside of Ontario.

The Court of Appeal concluded that the Ontario loss transfer scheme applies to Ontario insurers, regardless of where the policy was issued or where the loss takes place.  Since Allstate is an Ontario insurer, it was required to arbitrate Primmum’s claim, and the Allstate appeal was dismissed.

Link: Primmum Insurance Company v. Allstate Insurance Company, 2010 ONCA 756

Richard Hayles


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Insurance Investigators – What They Can and Cannot Do

Wednesday, October 13th, 2010

In striking out a Statement of Claim that raised arguments the Judge described as “beyond novel”, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice made some interesting observations regarding what is permissible during the investigation of an accident claim.

The plaintiff was involved in a car accident, and brought an action against the other driver.  As the case was coming up for trial, the defendant’s insurer, Dominion of Canada, hired Garda, a firm of private investigators, to conduct an investigation into the plaintiff’s activities and abilities.  When the investigator contacted a neighbor seeking information, the neighbor immediately reported this to the plaintiff, who apparently became upset over the fact that she was being investigated.  The plaintiff launched a second action, claiming damages for abuse of process and conspiracy, against Dominion, the Dominion adjuster, Garda, the Garda investigator, and even the other driver (Dominion’s insured).

The defendants in the second action brought a motion to strike the Statement of Claim on the grounds that it disclosed no cause of action, and was scandalous, frivolous, and vexatious.

The case contains concise and useful statements as to what makes up the torts of abuse of process and civil conspiracy.  According Ramsay, J., the tort of abuse of process is narrowly defined.  The plaintiff “must plead that a process was initiated against her before a tribunal for an improper or collateral purpose, and that there was some overt act or threat, separate and distinct from the proceedings themselves, but related to the improper purpose”.

Although private investigators are licensed and regulated by the Province and their investigation results are often presented as evidence in Court, this does not make an investigator into a tribunal.  Since the plaintiff’s allegations could never support a finding of liability for abuse of process, that portion of the statement of claim was struck out.

The plaintiff pleaded that the defendants conspired to intimidate her into dropping her claim in the motor vehicle action.  The judge stated that the tort of conspiracy to injure is available in two scenarios: (1) where the predominant purpose of the defendants’ conduct is to injure the plaintiff, whether the defendants’ actions are lawful or unlawful; and (2) where the defendants’ actions are unlawful, the conduct targets the plaintiff, and the defendants know or ought to know that the plaintiff is likely to suffer harm.  In either case, the plaintiff must suffer actual damage.

Since the plaintiff was not intimidated into dropping the original action, she suffered no harm, and the tort of conspiracy was not available to her.

The judge made some additional comments about what is and is not permissible behavior on the part of insurance investigators:

Insurance companies are entitled to conduct surveillance of plaintiffs if they do so within the confines of the law.  The cannot trespass on private property and they cannot intercept communications electronically.  They cannot threaten witnesses or litigants.  They cannot commit the tort of defamation.  The plaintiff does not claim that they did.  The fact that a private investigator is conducting an investigation is not defamatory.  Anyone who is involved in a car accident or a divorce might be investigated by a private investigator.

Insurance companies do not need grounds to believe that the plaintiff is making a fraudulent claim before they conduct an investigation.  They can conduct surveillance to refute a claim, or to see whether a claim is valid or not.  They can photograph a plaintiff in places open to public view.  They can identify themselves to neighbours, and ask them for information about the case.

Essentially, insurance companies have a right to use investigators to gather evidence on a claim, so long as the investigators do not commit any criminal or tortuous acts in the process.

Citation: Pontillo v. Zinger et al., 2010 ONSC 5537

http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2010/2010onsc5537/2010onsc5537.pdf

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D.


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.