Archive for the ‘Injunction & Specific Performance’ Category

Court Refuses to Enjoin Dance Teacher from Competing Against Her Former Employer

Friday, October 7th, 2011

The Plaintiff Ginette Laplante had operated Pascalina’s Dance Studio in Cornwall Ontario since 1992.  The Defendant Jane Hennessy-Craibe had been a student at Pascalina’s from 1993 to 1995.  She became a teacher’s aide with the studio in 1996 and an instructor in 1998.  Her duties as an instructor included choreography, costumes, and selecting hairstyles and make-up for recitals and competitions.

The parties entered into an “employment agreement” in 2008.  This agreement provided that Ms. Hennessy-Craibe was to be paid an hourly wage, and that she was to indemnify Pascalina’s for any actions arising out of her negligence.  It did not include a restrictive covenant or a non-compete clause.

In 2010, the parties had some discussions about the possibility that Ms. Hennessy-Craibe would purchase Ms. Laplante’s studio, but no agreement was reached and in 2011 Ms. Hennessy-Craibe set up her own dance school business in competition with the Plaintiff.

Ms. Laplante sued Ms. Hennessy-Craibe, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, and brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction prohibiting the Defendant from contacting or soliciting any current or former students, instructors, or dance team members from Pascalina’s Dance Studio.

According to the court, key employees such as managers, officers, or directors typically owe a fiduciary duty to their employer.  They may not make unfair use of confidential information acquired during the course of employment in order to solicit clients or misappropriate corporate opportunities.  A key employee is someone who is responsible for guiding the business affairs of the employer.  Key employees are involved in the decision-making process, or have access to confidential information that could impair the employer’s competitiveness if it were disclosed.

In the absence of a restrictive covenant or non-competition clause in an employment agreement, or a fiduciary duty arising from the fact that the employee qualifies as a key employee, a former employee has the right to compete with the employer.  She can use the skills and knowledge acquired in the employer’s service in her new business.

The court concluded that Ms. Hennessy-Craibe’s responsibilities in Ms. Laplante’s business “did not come close to the necessary elements required for a key employee”.  The fact that several students and instructors had followed her to her new business did not of itself constitute proof that the Defendant was a key employee.

Furthermore, the court stated that the contract between the parties, under which the Defendant was paid by the hour and responsible to indemnify the Plaintiff for actions arising out of her activities, would more properly be described as an agreement with an independent contractor, rather than an employment agreement.  The court therefore concluded that the Defendant had failed to meet the first stage of the three-part test for an interlocutory injunction, in that the Plaintiff had not established that there was a serious issue to be tried with respect to liability.

The court also found that the Plaintiff had not established irreparable harm, the second part of the three-part test for an injunction.  If the Plaintiff were to succeed at trial, her losses could be compensated in damages.

With respect to the third part of the three-part test, the balance of convenience, the court was satisfied that the balance of convenience favored the Defendant.  If the injunction was granted, it would prevent the Defendant from operating her business and teaching students who had already registered at her studio.

Finally, the court took note of the fact that the Plaintiff had failed to request a permanent junction in her Statement of Claim.  A claim for a permanent injunction in the Statement of Claim is a prerequisite for granting an interlocutory injunction.  This provided an additional reason for the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s motion.

Link: Laplante v.Hennessy-Craibe, CanLII – 2011 ONSC 5601 (CanLII)

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D.

Insurance and commercial litigation lawyer

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial and other litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

 

Federal Court of Appeal Upholds Federal Court Decision Granting Anti-Suit Injunction for Release of Vessel from Second Arrest

Tuesday, August 16th, 2011

In a previous blog posting on the Heydary Hamilton PC Blog Release of Arrest of Ship in Belgium stayed pending Appeal to Canadian Federal Court of Appeal which commented on  the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Alpha Trading Monaco Sam v The Ship “Sarah Degagnes” et al 2010 FCA 209 to grant a stay  of execution from the order of the Federal Court (made on a request for an anti-suit interlocutory injunction) that the appellant cause the release of the vessel “Sarah Desgagnes” from conservatory arrest in Belgium, where it is being held to secure the appellant’s claim in proceedings in Italy against the vessel’s subtime charterer  for unpaid bunkering invoices.

The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the order of the Federal Court on the appellants anti-suit interlocutory injunction that the appellant cause the release of the vessel “Sarah Desgagnes” from conservatory arrest in Belgium.  The appeal decision is reported at  Alpha Trading Monaco Sam v The Ship “Sarah Degagnes” et al 2011 FCA 41. In the reasons delivered from the Bench by Nadon J.A. the court reasoned that they ought not to interfere with the decision of the Federal Court “Given that the arrest [of the ship in Montreal] the respondents undertook to submit themselves and their ship to the jurisdiction of the Federal Court and to provide security for the appellant’s claims, and given that the re-arrest of their ship by the appellant in Belgium on May 4, 2010, in the particular circumstances of the case, clearly constitutes an attempt on the part of the appellant to take unfair advantage of the respondents by forcing them to provide security against a third party…”

David Alderson LL.B, LL.M (Lond.)

Practicing in Ontario (Canada)

Admitted (but not now practicing) in New York State, England and Wales, and Bermuda

Practiced in Dubai, UAE

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial and other litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Are you a victim of fraud / “investment”?

Friday, August 12th, 2011

Toronto has become a frequent setting for fraudulent activities which for the most part are presented as “investments” or some other attractive financial transaction. Our experience shows that those targeting individuals as potential victims of fraud often seek to gain the victim’s trust and comfort by associating with or holding out an association with large, well known and established entities.

Well known scams, such as “Ponzi schemes”, employ techniques which seek to demonstrate apparent legitimacy, where none exists. Grandiose, but fraudulent, representations of past dealings and promised returns on investment are the hallmarks of such frauds.  Often a small “payment” is made from the fraudulent scheme, to seek to avoid the concern and remorse a victim has about the represented investment.

The courts have identified a well established and growing list of so-called “badges of fraud”, those things which the courts typically identify and associate with the workings of a fraudulent scheme despite an outward appearance of legitimacy.

Often the victims are not ordinarily present in Toronto, making it less likely that they will pursue the perpetrator of the fraud in Toronto.  Other times the victim has not even made an investment, but has his or her assets exposed by fraudulent activity.

We know that victims sometimes are reluctant to admit that they have fallen prey to fraudulent schemes or to make public their loss.  Those who perpetrate fraudulent activity bank on that.

Don’t be a victim again by doing nothing about your loss.  We have considerable experience in acting for victims of fraud.  Call us today for a confidential initial consultation.

Javad Heydar, B.A., J.D.

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D.

David Alderson, LL.B, LL.M

Ruzbeh Hosseini, B.Sc., J.D., LL.B.

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial and other litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Defendant Cannot Access Mareva Funds To Pay His Legal Fees

Thursday, May 26th, 2011

Fred Curreri was induced to participate in a fraudulent scheme by his friend and advisor, Tito DiVincenzo.  Curreri impersonated his father, Fred Curreri Sr., in order to obtain mortgages on a number of his father’s properties.  DiVincenzo promised to invest the funds overseas, but no investments were made and the money disappeared. 

The lenders sued Curreri and obtained a Mareva injunction which required Curreri to pay a $250,000 lottery win into court.  Curreri did not defend the action, and the lenders obtained default judgment against him for approximately $2 million. 

Curreri then moved for payment out of court so that he could use the lottery winnings to pay his lawyers to defend the action and related criminal proceedings.  He also sought reasonable living expenses.  Evidence filed on the motion established that he was impecunious. 

Curreri did not move to set aside the default judgment, nor did he provide a draft statement of defence.  The judge hearing the motion refused to permit him to draw on the funds in court to pay his legal and living expenses.  This decision was upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal. 

In Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Credit Valley Institute of Business and Technology, [2003] 0. J. No. 40 (S.C.), Molloy, J. outlined a four-part test for a motion in which the defendant seeks to use money held under a Mareva injunction to pay legal and living expenses: 

  1. Has the defendant established that he has no assets available to pay his expenses apart from those held pursuant to the injunction? 
  2. Has the defendant shown that assets held pursuant to the injunction are “non-proprietary” in that they come from a source other than the plaintiff? 
  3. The defendant can draw on non-proprietary assets to pay reasonable living expenses, debts, and legal costs. The non-proprietary assets must be exhausted before the defendant can access money that is subject to the plaintiff’s proprietary claim. 
  4. If the previous three tests are met, and the defendant still requires funds, the court must balance the competing interests of the parties.  The strength of the plaintiff’s case is an important factor for the court to weigh in this balancing process. 

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the four-part test from Credit Valley is based on the premise that litigation is ongoing, and that there has been no final adjudication on the merits.  Since there was judgment against the defendant Curreri, and there had been no motion to set that judgment aside, the premise of the Credit Valley case was inapplicable: 

…there is no principled reason for the appellant to be able to deplete the funds in court which are subject to the judgment and available to judgment creditors.  As the motion judge explained, before judgment, or on a motion to set aside default judgment where potential merit is demonstrated, there is a principled basis to allow the defendant to use his own money for the defence of the action.  But once default judgment has been ordered, the findings are the other way on the merits.  Without more, the judgment will stand and there is no basis to allow the defendant to deplete the funds that are in court “to the credit of the action.”

The Court of Appeal concluded that Curreri had no defence on the merits.  Even if he was the dupe of DiVincenzo, the funds were advanced to him under the mortgages and had not been repaid.

The motion judge observed that Curreri would normally have the right to use the funds paid into court to defend criminal proceedings.  Nevertheless, since he was insolvent, he should qualify for legal aid and would not be denied counsel because of his finances.  The Court of Appeal agreed, and dismissed the appeal.

Link: B & M Handelman Investments Ltd. v. Curreri, 2011 ONCA 395

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D.

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Court Sets a High Bar for the Issuance of a Worldwide Mareva Injunction

Friday, April 15th, 2011

Atlas Copco Canada Inc. is the Canadian division of a multinational corporation that supplies mining and construction equipment.  Dirk Johannes Plate worked for Atlas for nearly 40 years, starting in his home country of the Netherlands.  In 1993 he transferred to Atlas Canada, where he served as general manager. 

As an expatriate employee, Mr. Plate was entitled to various benefits that were not available to Canadian employees, including an annual housing allowance of $60,000, plus fully paid trips to his home in the Netherlands.  Under company rules, however, he could not enrol in Atlas’s Canadian pension plan.  He remained a member of the Dutch pension plan, the terms of which were not as favourable as the provisions of the Canadian plan. 

Mr. Plate was unhappy with the benefits provided by the Dutch pension plan, and began to complain about this as early as one year after he started work with the Canadian subsidiary.  According to Atlas, this dissatisfaction led Mr. Plate to conspire with the company’s controller, its director of human resources, and it’s outside pension benefits insurer to divert company funds to purchase annuities and other assets for himself and other executives.  Atlas dismissed Mr. Plate and the others, then commenced legal proceedings seeking a Mareva injunction to freeze the conspirators’ assets until the dispute could be determined at trial. 

Although Atlas Canada claimed that the executives had defrauded it of over $20 million, the Mareva motion focused on some $1.44 million in annuities registered in the names of Mr. Plate and his wife Maria Plate. 

Atlas Canada obtained an interim order freezing the assets of Mr. Plate and his wife, and of the defendant Leo Caron, the Atlas Canada director of human resources, as well as Mr. Caron’s former wife Jeannette Bourque, pending a hearing of the Mareva motion on a full evidentiary record.  After various adjournments and amendments to the timetable for the motion, the motion came on for a determination before Madam Justice Mesbur, who delivered her decision on April 11, 2011. 

Neither Mr. Caron on nor his ex-wife Jeannette Bourque filed any material on the motion, nor did Maria Plate.  In the end, only Dirk Plate opposed the Mareva injunction.  He took the position that Atlas Canada had failed to meet the test for granting a Mareva against him, and asked that the existing order be dissolved.  The plaintiff Atlas Copco asked the court to continue that order, and to extend the asset freeze so that it would cover all of Mr. Plate’s assets anywhere in the world. 

Mesbur, J. granted an order freezing Mr. Plate’s Ontario assets (including the annuities) until trial, but declined the request for a worldwide Mareva.  She stated that injunctions are an extraordinary remedy, meaning that they are granted when the moving party can satisfy the following requirements: 

  1. has the moving party established that there is a serious case to be tried? 
  2. if the injunction is denied, would damages be an adequate remedy in the event that the plaintiff later succeeds at trial?
  3. is the plaintiff’s undertaking to pay damages in the event that an injunction is granted and the plaintiff loses at trial adequate compensation for the defendants?
  4. does the balance of convenience favour an injunction? 
  5. is an injunction justified after consideration of the strength of the plaintiff’s case? 

She took notice of the principle that execution is not available prior to judgment, and that the term “execution” includes orders impounding assets or otherwise restricting the defendant’s right to make use of his property.  Since the Mareva injunction is an exception to this general rule, the test on a Mareva motion is more stringent than the test that applies on an ordinary injunction motion. 

In order to obtain a Mareva injunction, the plaintiff must show that it has a strong prima facie case on liability and that there is a real risk that the defendant will remove assets from the jurisdiction or dissipate them in order to prevent the plaintiff from recovering damages after judgment.  In addition, the balance of convenience must be in the plaintiff’s favour. 

The outcome of the motion turned primarily on the question of whether or not the plaintiff had made out a strong prima facie case of fraud as against the defendant Dirk Plate. 

Mr. Plate took the position that the annuities were purchased with the approval of the director of human resources (the defendant Leo Caron), as part of an agreement to top up his pension so as to make it equivalent to the Canadian plan.  He claimed that this was done with the knowledge of the Atlas Copco pension committee, as well as the company’s outside pension plan actuary.  As evidence to support his position, he pointed to a February 2001 e-mail from Mr. Caron to himself confirming an agreement to include Mr. Plate in the Canadian pension system, retroactive to January of 1983.  He claimed that this e-mail was copied to the secretary of the pension committee, who forwarded it to the outside actuaries. 

Mr. Plate also relied on a July, 2001 e-mail from Mr. Caron to the company’s actuary confirming that Mr. Plate was enrolled in the Canadian plan.  In addition, the actuary sent a letter in March of 2002 providing Mr. Caron with an estimate of Mr. Plate’s retirement income from “the two registered Company pensions [sic] plans”. 

Mr. Plate’s position was undermined by evidence provided by the company showing that Mr. Plate’s contract always classified him as an expatriate employee, and thus not entitled to participate in the Canadian pension plan.  The minutes of the company’s pension committee and of the Board of Directors contained no reference to enrolling Mr. Plate in the Canadian plan, or to buying annuities to compensate him for the supposed pension plan shortfall.  This course of action was never authorized in writing by Mr. Plate’s superiors, but only in the e-mail from Mr. Caron to Mr. Plate.  No copy of that e-mail could be found in any Atlas file. 

In addition, there was a discrepancy between the actuarial calculation of the cost of an annuity to top up Mr. Plate’s Dutch pension, which came in at just over $450,000, and the actual annuities purchased for a total of $1.44 million.  Further, Mr. Plate began to draw on the annuities in 2007, four years prior to his planned retirement date. 

The most damning evidence against Mr. Plate, however, was the fact that Mr. Caron confessed to participating in the fraudulent scheme, and gave sworn testimony that it was Mr. Plate himself who told him to buy the annuities.  In addition, the defendant David Hillier, the company controller, had confessed to participating in the scheme and had paid back some of the stolen funds to the company. 

When Atlas Copco Canada learned of the fraudulent scheme, it terminated Mr. Plate’s employment.  Some two weeks following termination, Mr. Plate transferred ownership of a jointly owned Dutch property into his wife’s name alone.  Not long after that, he did the same thing with two jointly held Québec properties.  He also tried to dispose of the annuities after his dismissal. 

Based on this evidence, Madam Justice Mesbur concluded that the plaintiff had made out a strong prima facie case of fraud. 

The judge concluded that Mr. Plate’s dealings with his properties immediately after his termination were highly suspicious, and led to an inference that he was attempting to insulate himself against judgment.  Mr. and Mrs. Plate provided inconsistent explanations for the property transfers, leading to the conclusion that a Mareva injunction was an appropriate remedy as against Mr. Plate. 

Since Atlas Copco had produced evidence from a bookkeeper with the company’s pension benefits insurer establishing that the Plates’ annuities had been purchased with company funds, the annuities constituted assets forming the subject matter of the litigation, and they could be preserved pending trial under rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.  The Québec assets were now in Maria Plate’s name, and she had not opposed the plaintiff’s motion to continue the injunction freezing those assets until trial.  The question to be determined, then, was whether a Mareva injunction could be issued restraining Mr. Plate from dealing with assets located outside of Canada. 

Mesbur, J. described the Mareva injunction as an “order in personam.”  Since Ontario was the proper forum for the case, the Ontario court had personal jurisdiction over Mr. Plate and was thus in a position to issue a Mareva injunction with worldwide application.  The judge concluded, however, that the injunction should not be expanded beyond the property in Ontario. 

Although the company alleged that the defendants were responsible for defalcations totalling as much as $20 million, as of the date of the motion they had put forward a compelling case with respect to some $1.8 million, most of which could be traced to the annuities preserved under Rule 45.  There was thus no evidentiary basis for issuing a Mareva injunction to cover all of Mr. Plate’s assets, wherever situated. 

The decision imposes a very high evidentiary standard on a plaintiff seeking to restrain the disposal of assets by means of a Mareva injunction.  The evidence indicating that Mr. Plate had defrauded the company was extremely strong.  There was also evidence indicating that further monies had gone missing during Mr. Plate’s tenure with the company.  Even so, it appears that the court was not prepared to expand the scope of the Mareva in the absence of evidence showing that Mr. Plate himself was responsible for the disappearance of the additional funds, or that those funds could be traced to a specific asset under his ownership.  

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D. 

Link: Atlas Copco Canada Inc. v. Hillier, Plate, et al., CanLII – 2011 ONSC 2277 (CanLII)

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Interlocutory Injunction Against Ontario Racing Commission Is Set Aside

Friday, April 1st, 2011

The Ontario Superior Court of Justice has confirmed that an injunction, obtained on short notice, can be set aside where the respondent shows that if it had been provided with an opportunity to file evidence and make submissions at the original hearing, the injunction would never have been issued.

The applicant was a trainer and owner of racehorses.  He entered some horses into races at Kawartha Downs racetrack, a facility that is supervised by the respondent Ontario Racing Commission.  The applicant became upset when one of his horses was disqualified because it was brought to the paddock late.  When another of his horses won a subsequent race, he threw what the court described as “a temper tantrum” in the winners’ circle.  He made obscene gestures and swore at the judges.  This behavior took place in full view of the spectators at the track, and was also captured on television.

The Racing Commission judges at the track that day suspended the applicant from racing until a hearing regarding his conduct could be held.

Rather than wait for the hearing, or pursuing grievance procedures available to him under the Racing Commission Act, the applicant went to court for an interlocutory injunction.  He gave the respondent Racing Commission only 90 minutes notice.  The Commission was not able to respond, and the interlocutory injunction was issued based on materials filed by the applicant and on submissions made by his lawyers only.  The judge hearing the motion for the interlocutory injunction stayed the revocation of the applicant’s racing licenses and allowed the applicant to enter his horses into races until the next return date of the motion.

When the motion came on for hearing again, the respondent asked that the interlocutory injunction be set aside.  Mr. Justice Parayeski noted that the affidavit filed by the applicant at the time the injunction was issued was selective as to the facts that were disclosed to the court.  He stated that before an interlocutory injunction can be granted, the applicant had to show that: 

  • there is a serious issue to be tried; 
  • he will suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not granted; and 
  • the balance of convenience is in favour of granting the injunction. 

On the question of whether there was a serious issue to be tried, the court found that the application was premature in that the applicant had not sought the administrative relief that was available to him under the legislation that governed horseracing in Ontario. 

Another factor affecting the court’s determination of whether or not there was a serious issue to be tried was the fact that the applicant admitted that his conduct was a breach of the Commission’s rules.  Thus the only issue was penalty, and suspension of the applicant’s participation in racing is a penalty that is available under the relevant legislation.  Case law is clear that deference is owed to decisions made by the Commission in its efforts to regulate the racing industry. 

On the question of irreparable harm, the applicant’s lawyer argued that interruption of the applicant’s ability to race horses and earn a living automatically constitutes irreparable harm.  The court disagreed.  The suspension was not permanent.  Losses of income resulting from the suspension would be calculable and compensable, and thus were not truly irreparable. 

On the balance of convenience, Mr. Justice Parayeski said that he had to weigh an interruption in the applicant’s livelihood against the authority and ability of the Commission to manage racing in the public interest.  He found that the inconvenience to the Commission outweighed the admittedly serious consequences of the suspension for the applicant. 

In conclusion, Mr. Justice Parayeski found that the interlocutory injunction ought not to have been granted, and that it would not have been granted if the Commission had been given an opportunity to present evidence and argument on the original return date.  He set the injunction aside. 

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D. 

Link: Waxman v. Ontario Racing Commission, 2011 ONSC 1908 (CanLII)

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

No “Fourth Defence” to Enforcement of Foreign Injunctions (Non-Money Judgments) in Ontario

Thursday, October 14th, 2010

Recently, the Ontario Court of Appeal in United States of America v. Yemec, 2010 ONCA 414 considered the following interesting issues:

1.      whether there is a fourth defence to enforcement of a foreign judgment based on the “loss of a meaningful opportunity to be heard”;

2.      whether a foreign equitable remedy (an injunction) is enforceable by courts in Ontario; and

3.      whether the Defendants’ damages inquiry relating to the U.S. government’s undertakings made to the Ontario Superior Court in support of obtaining a Mareva injunction (freezing order) and an Anton Piller order (civil seizure order) should proceed.

While addressing the first issue, the Court refused to add a fourth defence – a meaningful opportunity to be heard – to the three central defences in common law in Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416 , namely, fraud, denial of natural justice and public policy.

The Court discussed Beals, in which the Supreme Court of Canada held that, whilst “the list of available defences is not closed” the new defence of  “loss of a meaningful opportunity to be heard” must be different in scope and content from the natural justice defence; and that it must relate not to the process and procedures of the foreign court but to some significant unfairness in the way the litigation has proceeded or has been conducted.

The Court found that the fourth defence raised in this case was indistinguishable from the natural justice defence. In addition, the Court stated that the defendants were not to be deprived of a meaningful opportunity to be heard in the U.S. court proceedings.

Whilst dealing with the second issue, the Court followed Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., [2006] 2. S.C.R. 612, where the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that courts in Canada may now enforce foreign equitable orders such as foreign injunctions (not just foreign money judgments) and enumerated the following factors to consider in determining enforceability:

a.       Are the terms of the order clear and specific enough to ensure that the defendant will know what is expected from him or her?

b.      Is the order limited in its scope and did the originating court retain the power to issue further orders?

c.       Is the enforcement the least burdensome remedy for the Canadian justice system?

d.      Is the Canadian litigant exposed to unforeseen obligations?

e.       Are any third parties affected by the order?

f.       Will the use of judicial resources be consistent with what would be allowed for domestic litigants?

In considering the third issue, the Court held that the defendants’ damages inquiry should proceed. The Court stressed the “serious nature of a damages undertaking” and held that the Plaintiff “could not seek to avoid an inquiry into damages on the basis that the undertakings were worthless from the outset since there could be no damages flowing from the termination of an illegal operation”.

Indeed, the Court noted that “it may be difficult for the defendants to prove that they have suffered compensable damages” due to the illegality of the defendants’ business. Nonetheless, the Court held that the defendants should not be “denied the opportunity to present their evidence and make full argument”.

Citations:         United States of America v. Yemec, 2010 ONCA 414

Beals v. Saldanha, 2003 SCC 72, [2003] 3 S.C.R. 416

Pro Swing Inc. v. Elta Golf Inc., [2006] 2. S.C.R. 612

David Alderson, LL.B, LL.M (Lond.)

Masha Loftus, M.A., J.D


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Release of Arrest of Ship in Belgium stayed pending Appeal to Canadian Federal Court of Appeal

Monday, September 27th, 2010

The appellant sought a stay of execution from the order of the Federal Court (made on a request for an anti-suit interlocutory injunction) that the appellant cause the release of the vessel “Sarah Desgagnes” from conservatory arrest in Belgium, where it is being held to secure the appellant’s claim in proceedings in Italy against the vessel’s subtime charterer  for unpaid bunkering invoices ..

The Federal Court had found that the appellant’s action was vexatious and oppressive because the ship had previously been released from arrest in Canada on an undertaking by the respondents to post bail.

The Federal Court of Appeal granted the stay on the appellant satisfying the thee-pronged test formulated in RJR-MacDonald Inc. v Canada (Attorney General), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 311: that there is a serious question to be decided on the appeal, refusing the stay is likely to cause irreparable harm to the appellant, and that the balance of convenience favours staying the order pending the disposition of the appeal.

The court noted that the law of Belgium appears to permit the arrest of a ship to secure a debt against a time-charterer in circumstances the law of Canada does not

The respondents’ argument that the appellant was already in breach of the Federal Court’s order to release the vessel “forthwith” was not accepted by the Federal Court of Appeal, which said that a judgment of the Federal Court “should not be interpreted, or regarded, as denying a party an effective opportunity to exercise its right of appeal to this Court”.

David Alderson, LL.B, LL.M (Lond.)

Citation: Alpha Trading Monaco Sam v The Ship “Sarah Degagnes” et al 2010 FCA 209


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.