Archive for the ‘Fraud’ Category

Are you a victim of fraud / “investment”?

Friday, August 12th, 2011

Toronto has become a frequent setting for fraudulent activities which for the most part are presented as “investments” or some other attractive financial transaction. Our experience shows that those targeting individuals as potential victims of fraud often seek to gain the victim’s trust and comfort by associating with or holding out an association with large, well known and established entities.

Well known scams, such as “Ponzi schemes”, employ techniques which seek to demonstrate apparent legitimacy, where none exists. Grandiose, but fraudulent, representations of past dealings and promised returns on investment are the hallmarks of such frauds.  Often a small “payment” is made from the fraudulent scheme, to seek to avoid the concern and remorse a victim has about the represented investment.

The courts have identified a well established and growing list of so-called “badges of fraud”, those things which the courts typically identify and associate with the workings of a fraudulent scheme despite an outward appearance of legitimacy.

Often the victims are not ordinarily present in Toronto, making it less likely that they will pursue the perpetrator of the fraud in Toronto.  Other times the victim has not even made an investment, but has his or her assets exposed by fraudulent activity.

We know that victims sometimes are reluctant to admit that they have fallen prey to fraudulent schemes or to make public their loss.  Those who perpetrate fraudulent activity bank on that.

Don’t be a victim again by doing nothing about your loss.  We have considerable experience in acting for victims of fraud.  Call us today for a confidential initial consultation.

Javad Heydar, B.A., J.D.

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D.

David Alderson, LL.B, LL.M

Ruzbeh Hosseini, B.Sc., J.D., LL.B.

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial and other litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Defendant Cannot Access Mareva Funds To Pay His Legal Fees

Thursday, May 26th, 2011

Fred Curreri was induced to participate in a fraudulent scheme by his friend and advisor, Tito DiVincenzo.  Curreri impersonated his father, Fred Curreri Sr., in order to obtain mortgages on a number of his father’s properties.  DiVincenzo promised to invest the funds overseas, but no investments were made and the money disappeared. 

The lenders sued Curreri and obtained a Mareva injunction which required Curreri to pay a $250,000 lottery win into court.  Curreri did not defend the action, and the lenders obtained default judgment against him for approximately $2 million. 

Curreri then moved for payment out of court so that he could use the lottery winnings to pay his lawyers to defend the action and related criminal proceedings.  He also sought reasonable living expenses.  Evidence filed on the motion established that he was impecunious. 

Curreri did not move to set aside the default judgment, nor did he provide a draft statement of defence.  The judge hearing the motion refused to permit him to draw on the funds in court to pay his legal and living expenses.  This decision was upheld by the Ontario Court of Appeal. 

In Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce v. Credit Valley Institute of Business and Technology, [2003] 0. J. No. 40 (S.C.), Molloy, J. outlined a four-part test for a motion in which the defendant seeks to use money held under a Mareva injunction to pay legal and living expenses: 

  1. Has the defendant established that he has no assets available to pay his expenses apart from those held pursuant to the injunction? 
  2. Has the defendant shown that assets held pursuant to the injunction are “non-proprietary” in that they come from a source other than the plaintiff? 
  3. The defendant can draw on non-proprietary assets to pay reasonable living expenses, debts, and legal costs. The non-proprietary assets must be exhausted before the defendant can access money that is subject to the plaintiff’s proprietary claim. 
  4. If the previous three tests are met, and the defendant still requires funds, the court must balance the competing interests of the parties.  The strength of the plaintiff’s case is an important factor for the court to weigh in this balancing process. 

The Court of Appeal agreed with the motion judge that the four-part test from Credit Valley is based on the premise that litigation is ongoing, and that there has been no final adjudication on the merits.  Since there was judgment against the defendant Curreri, and there had been no motion to set that judgment aside, the premise of the Credit Valley case was inapplicable: 

…there is no principled reason for the appellant to be able to deplete the funds in court which are subject to the judgment and available to judgment creditors.  As the motion judge explained, before judgment, or on a motion to set aside default judgment where potential merit is demonstrated, there is a principled basis to allow the defendant to use his own money for the defence of the action.  But once default judgment has been ordered, the findings are the other way on the merits.  Without more, the judgment will stand and there is no basis to allow the defendant to deplete the funds that are in court “to the credit of the action.”

The Court of Appeal concluded that Curreri had no defence on the merits.  Even if he was the dupe of DiVincenzo, the funds were advanced to him under the mortgages and had not been repaid.

The motion judge observed that Curreri would normally have the right to use the funds paid into court to defend criminal proceedings.  Nevertheless, since he was insolvent, he should qualify for legal aid and would not be denied counsel because of his finances.  The Court of Appeal agreed, and dismissed the appeal.

Link: B & M Handelman Investments Ltd. v. Curreri, 2011 ONCA 395

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D.

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Court Sets a High Bar for the Issuance of a Worldwide Mareva Injunction

Friday, April 15th, 2011

Atlas Copco Canada Inc. is the Canadian division of a multinational corporation that supplies mining and construction equipment.  Dirk Johannes Plate worked for Atlas for nearly 40 years, starting in his home country of the Netherlands.  In 1993 he transferred to Atlas Canada, where he served as general manager. 

As an expatriate employee, Mr. Plate was entitled to various benefits that were not available to Canadian employees, including an annual housing allowance of $60,000, plus fully paid trips to his home in the Netherlands.  Under company rules, however, he could not enrol in Atlas’s Canadian pension plan.  He remained a member of the Dutch pension plan, the terms of which were not as favourable as the provisions of the Canadian plan. 

Mr. Plate was unhappy with the benefits provided by the Dutch pension plan, and began to complain about this as early as one year after he started work with the Canadian subsidiary.  According to Atlas, this dissatisfaction led Mr. Plate to conspire with the company’s controller, its director of human resources, and it’s outside pension benefits insurer to divert company funds to purchase annuities and other assets for himself and other executives.  Atlas dismissed Mr. Plate and the others, then commenced legal proceedings seeking a Mareva injunction to freeze the conspirators’ assets until the dispute could be determined at trial. 

Although Atlas Canada claimed that the executives had defrauded it of over $20 million, the Mareva motion focused on some $1.44 million in annuities registered in the names of Mr. Plate and his wife Maria Plate. 

Atlas Canada obtained an interim order freezing the assets of Mr. Plate and his wife, and of the defendant Leo Caron, the Atlas Canada director of human resources, as well as Mr. Caron’s former wife Jeannette Bourque, pending a hearing of the Mareva motion on a full evidentiary record.  After various adjournments and amendments to the timetable for the motion, the motion came on for a determination before Madam Justice Mesbur, who delivered her decision on April 11, 2011. 

Neither Mr. Caron on nor his ex-wife Jeannette Bourque filed any material on the motion, nor did Maria Plate.  In the end, only Dirk Plate opposed the Mareva injunction.  He took the position that Atlas Canada had failed to meet the test for granting a Mareva against him, and asked that the existing order be dissolved.  The plaintiff Atlas Copco asked the court to continue that order, and to extend the asset freeze so that it would cover all of Mr. Plate’s assets anywhere in the world. 

Mesbur, J. granted an order freezing Mr. Plate’s Ontario assets (including the annuities) until trial, but declined the request for a worldwide Mareva.  She stated that injunctions are an extraordinary remedy, meaning that they are granted when the moving party can satisfy the following requirements: 

  1. has the moving party established that there is a serious case to be tried? 
  2. if the injunction is denied, would damages be an adequate remedy in the event that the plaintiff later succeeds at trial?
  3. is the plaintiff’s undertaking to pay damages in the event that an injunction is granted and the plaintiff loses at trial adequate compensation for the defendants?
  4. does the balance of convenience favour an injunction? 
  5. is an injunction justified after consideration of the strength of the plaintiff’s case? 

She took notice of the principle that execution is not available prior to judgment, and that the term “execution” includes orders impounding assets or otherwise restricting the defendant’s right to make use of his property.  Since the Mareva injunction is an exception to this general rule, the test on a Mareva motion is more stringent than the test that applies on an ordinary injunction motion. 

In order to obtain a Mareva injunction, the plaintiff must show that it has a strong prima facie case on liability and that there is a real risk that the defendant will remove assets from the jurisdiction or dissipate them in order to prevent the plaintiff from recovering damages after judgment.  In addition, the balance of convenience must be in the plaintiff’s favour. 

The outcome of the motion turned primarily on the question of whether or not the plaintiff had made out a strong prima facie case of fraud as against the defendant Dirk Plate. 

Mr. Plate took the position that the annuities were purchased with the approval of the director of human resources (the defendant Leo Caron), as part of an agreement to top up his pension so as to make it equivalent to the Canadian plan.  He claimed that this was done with the knowledge of the Atlas Copco pension committee, as well as the company’s outside pension plan actuary.  As evidence to support his position, he pointed to a February 2001 e-mail from Mr. Caron to himself confirming an agreement to include Mr. Plate in the Canadian pension system, retroactive to January of 1983.  He claimed that this e-mail was copied to the secretary of the pension committee, who forwarded it to the outside actuaries. 

Mr. Plate also relied on a July, 2001 e-mail from Mr. Caron to the company’s actuary confirming that Mr. Plate was enrolled in the Canadian plan.  In addition, the actuary sent a letter in March of 2002 providing Mr. Caron with an estimate of Mr. Plate’s retirement income from “the two registered Company pensions [sic] plans”. 

Mr. Plate’s position was undermined by evidence provided by the company showing that Mr. Plate’s contract always classified him as an expatriate employee, and thus not entitled to participate in the Canadian pension plan.  The minutes of the company’s pension committee and of the Board of Directors contained no reference to enrolling Mr. Plate in the Canadian plan, or to buying annuities to compensate him for the supposed pension plan shortfall.  This course of action was never authorized in writing by Mr. Plate’s superiors, but only in the e-mail from Mr. Caron to Mr. Plate.  No copy of that e-mail could be found in any Atlas file. 

In addition, there was a discrepancy between the actuarial calculation of the cost of an annuity to top up Mr. Plate’s Dutch pension, which came in at just over $450,000, and the actual annuities purchased for a total of $1.44 million.  Further, Mr. Plate began to draw on the annuities in 2007, four years prior to his planned retirement date. 

The most damning evidence against Mr. Plate, however, was the fact that Mr. Caron confessed to participating in the fraudulent scheme, and gave sworn testimony that it was Mr. Plate himself who told him to buy the annuities.  In addition, the defendant David Hillier, the company controller, had confessed to participating in the scheme and had paid back some of the stolen funds to the company. 

When Atlas Copco Canada learned of the fraudulent scheme, it terminated Mr. Plate’s employment.  Some two weeks following termination, Mr. Plate transferred ownership of a jointly owned Dutch property into his wife’s name alone.  Not long after that, he did the same thing with two jointly held Québec properties.  He also tried to dispose of the annuities after his dismissal. 

Based on this evidence, Madam Justice Mesbur concluded that the plaintiff had made out a strong prima facie case of fraud. 

The judge concluded that Mr. Plate’s dealings with his properties immediately after his termination were highly suspicious, and led to an inference that he was attempting to insulate himself against judgment.  Mr. and Mrs. Plate provided inconsistent explanations for the property transfers, leading to the conclusion that a Mareva injunction was an appropriate remedy as against Mr. Plate. 

Since Atlas Copco had produced evidence from a bookkeeper with the company’s pension benefits insurer establishing that the Plates’ annuities had been purchased with company funds, the annuities constituted assets forming the subject matter of the litigation, and they could be preserved pending trial under rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.  The Québec assets were now in Maria Plate’s name, and she had not opposed the plaintiff’s motion to continue the injunction freezing those assets until trial.  The question to be determined, then, was whether a Mareva injunction could be issued restraining Mr. Plate from dealing with assets located outside of Canada. 

Mesbur, J. described the Mareva injunction as an “order in personam.”  Since Ontario was the proper forum for the case, the Ontario court had personal jurisdiction over Mr. Plate and was thus in a position to issue a Mareva injunction with worldwide application.  The judge concluded, however, that the injunction should not be expanded beyond the property in Ontario. 

Although the company alleged that the defendants were responsible for defalcations totalling as much as $20 million, as of the date of the motion they had put forward a compelling case with respect to some $1.8 million, most of which could be traced to the annuities preserved under Rule 45.  There was thus no evidentiary basis for issuing a Mareva injunction to cover all of Mr. Plate’s assets, wherever situated. 

The decision imposes a very high evidentiary standard on a plaintiff seeking to restrain the disposal of assets by means of a Mareva injunction.  The evidence indicating that Mr. Plate had defrauded the company was extremely strong.  There was also evidence indicating that further monies had gone missing during Mr. Plate’s tenure with the company.  Even so, it appears that the court was not prepared to expand the scope of the Mareva in the absence of evidence showing that Mr. Plate himself was responsible for the disappearance of the additional funds, or that those funds could be traced to a specific asset under his ownership.  

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D. 

Link: Atlas Copco Canada Inc. v. Hillier, Plate, et al., CanLII – 2011 ONSC 2277 (CanLII)

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Freight Forwarder refuses Shipper’s Request to Amend Bill of Lading

Thursday, March 3rd, 2011

The Federal Court of Canada granted the plaintiff, freight forwarder, in Kuehne + Nagel v Agrimax Ltd. 2010 FC 1303 summary judgment for freight paid on behalf of the defendant and for sum they were liable to pay in demurrage. 

The Honourable Justice Harrington of the Federal Court of Canada said “Agrimax Ltd. refuses to pay Kuehne + Nagels’s account because it did the right thing. It refused to issue a fraudulent bill of lading”. 

The court held that pursuant to its contract with Agrimax, the plaintiff made arrangements with Blue Anchor Line for the shipment of 22 containers of crude sulphur to be received at Irricana, Alberta, for pre-carriage by truck and rail to Vancouver where the cargo was to be loaded on board the OOCL Kuala Lumpur for carriage to and discharge at Haldia, India. 

The bill of lading issued by the plaintiff, as agents for Blue Anchor Line, was dated at Calgary on 25 August 2008. The cargo is said to have been “received for shipment in apparent good order and condition” at Irricana and shipped on board OOCL Kuala Lumpur on September 4, 2008. 

The purchaser’s bank refused to take up the bills of lading and refused to honour the letter of credit on the grounds that the shipment was to have commenced by 31 August 2008.  Agrimax requested that the bill of lading be altered to remove the date on which the cargo had been shipped on board the OOCL Kuala Lumpur, wanting the “erroneous date of September 4, 2008” to be removed and called for an “on board bill”. 

In its analysis the trial judge described that a bill of lading contains various representation on behalf of the carrier, including the date when the cargo was “received for shipment” or “shipped” on board, as the case may be.  

Under the Hague-Visby Rules, Schedule 1 to the Marine Liability Act, a shipper may simply demand a “received for shipment” bill of lading, and irrespective of whether or not it demanded a “received for shipment” bill of lading, it may also demand a “shipped” bill of lading, once the cargo is loaded on board the carrying ship.

In this case, Agrimax Ltd. demanded, after the fact, an amendment to the bill of lading so that the date the cargo was taken on board the OOCL Kuala Lumpur would not appear. The court held that the plaintiff was absolutely right in its refusal to amend the bill of lading. 

In passing, the trial judge noted that “some carriers have, at their folly, issued such documents against letter of credit”, but such letters of indemnity are unenforceable under both English and Canadian law. 

David Keith Alderson LL.B, LL.M (Lond.)

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

‘Til Death (or landed immigrant status) do us part: Marriage Fraud

Thursday, December 2nd, 2010

During the past few months, the Canadian government has openly vowed to actively deal with marriage fraud. Immigration Minister, Jason Kenney, has been conducting cross-country town hall meetings in an effort to exchange ideas with Canadians on how to best combat the persistent problem of marriage fraud.

Marriage fraud, for Canadian immigration purposes, occurs when a person marries a Canadian permanent resident or citizen for the sole purpose of gaining entry into Canada.  The spouse in Canada is unaware of the foreign national’s true intentions and is swept away by the emotions of what he or she perceives to be true love and sincere affection. The foreign national’s true intentions are often revealed only after the foreign spouse has landed in Canada as a permanent resident of this country. It is not uncommon to hear stories of spouses in Canada eagerly awaiting the arrival of their loved one, only to discover that their loved one is already in Canada and has no intention of living with them.

To add insult to injury, the spouse in Canada is required to provide financial support to the foreign national for 3 years from the date of that person’s landing in Canada. As part of their application to sponsor their foreign spouse, the Canadian citizen or permanent resident is required to sign an undertaking “to provide food, clothing, shelter, fuel, utilities, household supplies, personal requirements, and other goods and services, including dental care, eye care, and other health needs not provided by public health care.” The undertaking also states that the foreign spouse will not need to apply for social assistance.  The undertaking is a contract between the Canadian citizen or permanent resident and the Canadian government; therefore, it supersedes any separation agreement between the spouses or any court order relating to spousal support.  Furthermore, if the foreign national applies for and receives social assistance within the three-year period, the Canadian citizen or permanent resident spouse must repay the government all monies provided to their spouse.

The Immigration and Refugee Protection Regulations prohibit marriage fraud under section 4(1), which states that “[f]or the purposes of these Regulations, a foreign national shall not be considered a spouse, a common-law partner or a conjugal partner of a person if the marriage, common-law partnership or conjugal partnership

(a) was entered into primarily for the purpose of acquiring any status or privilege under the [Immigration and Refugee Protection Act (“the Act”)]; or

(b) is not genuine.

Furthermore, under section 40(a) of the Act, “[a] permanent resident or a foreign national is inadmissible for misrepresentation for directly or indirectly misrepresenting or withholding material facts relating to a relevant matter that induces or could induce an error in the administration of this Act” and, under section 41(a) of the Act, a foreign national is “inadmissible for failing to comply with this Act through an act or omission which contravenes, directly or indirectly, a provision of this Act.”

Foreign nationals who contravene those provisions of the Act through misrepresentation or non-compliance are subject to enforcement action including an order removing them from Canada and an exclusion order, preventing them from returning to Canada without written authorization during the one-year period after the exclusion order was enforced.

More importantly, marriage fraudsters should be stripped of their status as permanent residents of Canada by virtue of section 4(1), which clearly states that they are not considered a spouse under the immigration laws of Canada. Since they are not a “spouse” under the Act, they should not be allowed to remain in Canada on a basis of a spousal sponsorship application. The practical effects of section 4(1) should be similar to the practical effects of section 117(9)(d) of the Regulations, which encompasses cases where a person fails to truthfully declare that he or she has a spouse or dependent children when he or she applied for and became a permanent resident.  In the latter case, the spouse or dependent child are not considered family members of the permanent resident and, therefore, cannot be sponsored as members of the family class.  Similarly, by virtue of section 4(1) of the Act, foreign nationals who become permanent residents of Canada through a bad faith marriage, should not be considered spouses of the Canadian citizen or permanent resident who sponsored them and, accordingly, they should lose the permanent resident status which is based on the bad faith marriage.

Sadly, most victims of marriage fraud have little recourse but to report their spouses to Citizenship and Immigration Canada (“CIC”)and Canada Border Services Agency (“CBSA”).  Although immigration law provides them with the authority to punish marriage fraudsters, neither the CIC nor the CBSA have enforcement or man power to investigate, pursue and remove these immigration law violators from Canada. Oftentimes, victims of marriage fraud find themselves re-victimized by immigration officials who, subconsciously or otherwise, view them as the authors of their own predicament.

Current immigration law and procedure have established specific steps and requirements specifically to ensure that bad faith marriages are caught before permanent resident visas are granted or issued.  Some immigration officials are of the view that their work is done once the spousal sponsorship and permanent resident application has been scrutinized and approved. The Canadian citizen or permanent resident, having successfully convinced immigration officials of the genuineness of their marriage, may find little sympathy from those officials when seeking help to remove a spouse due to a claim of a bad faith marriage.

Some victims of marriage fraud are calling for an American-style conditional permanent resident status to be granted to spouses. The conditions of permanent residence would be removed upon the spouses remaining married in Canada for a certain number of years, after which the foreign spouse would be granted unconditional permanent residence.  Advocates of this approach argue that a person in a bad faith marriage would have a difficult time maintaining the facade for an extended period of time.  However, this approach might lead to situations where a foreign spouse is abused and feels compelled to remain in an abusive relationship for fear of losing their status in Canada.

The Canadian government is looking at various ways to combat marriage fraud.  They hope to have a workable solution within the coming year and pass new laws that will make it tougher for those who wish to gain entry into Canada through bad faith marriages with Canadian citizens or permanent residents.  They are aiming for a solution that strikes a delicate balance discouraging bad faith marriages while keeping the doors of Canada open for those who have genuine marriages.  In the meantime, entry into Canada remains one romance away for people who, without regard for the emotional and financial cost to their unsuspecting victim, are intent on gaining status in this country.

Margie L. Primero


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Toronto Court Reaches Finding of Fraud in Case Involving Leading Canadian Business Law Firm

Friday, November 12th, 2010

ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT DECIDES CASE WHERE ELDERLY AMERICAN INVESTORS ALLEGE CASSELS BROCK, A LAW FIRM HEADED BY A FORMER PREMIER OF ONTARIO, PLAYED A ROLE IN A FRAUDULENT INVESTMENT SCHEME OF A FORMER CLIENT

TORONTO, Nov. 12 /CNW/ – The Ontario Superior Court, in a recent decision concerning two separate lawsuits, granted Judgment in favour of the Plaintiffs in each lawsuit for fraud against Robert Hryniak, a Toronto resident, who held himself out as the principal of Tropos Financial Corporation and Tropos Capital Inc., in a fraudulent scheme which is commonly known as “Prime Bank Fraud”.

In particular, the Court granted partial judgment against Mr. Hryniak in the sums of $1,190,401 USD and $1,000,000 USD, respectively, on two motions for summary judgment brought by 14 American investors who claim that a one-time Managing Partner (Gregory Jack Peebles) of Cassels Brock and Blackwell LLP and a former long-standing client, Robert Hryniak, were complicit in a scheme to defraud them and other investors across North America of millions of dollars.

The motions for summary judgment alleged that the involvement of Cassels Brock and Blackwell LLP and Gregory Jack Peebles added an air of credibility and plausibility to the fraudulent investment scheme.

In detailing the evidence on the motion, The Honourable Mr. Justice Grace remarked that “[t]he threads of dishonesty are everywhere”.

While Judgment was not granted against Cassels Brock and Blackwell LLP and Mr. Peebles, Justice Grace noted Mr. Peebles’ disregard for the Rules of Professional Conduct of the Law Society of Upper Canada.  Moreover, Justice Grace found it “troubling” that Mr. Peebles had virtually no recollection of what transpired during meetings with Mr. Hryniak, his client of many years, and Justice Grace concluded that he was “dissatisfied, concerned and highly suspicious” of Mr. Peebles’ evidence.

Justice Grace was also troubled by the lack of proper procedures of Cassels Brock and Blackwell LLP. The Court’s expression of concern is well founded as the Plaintiffs established that Cassels Brock and Blackwell LLP failed to follow the procedures for dealing with trust funds imposed on lawyers by the Law Society of Upper Canada. This is more troubling when put in context of Mr. Hryniak’s fraudulent conduct, which was so obvious that a lawyer at another law firm, Mr. Jeffrey M. Slopen, having attended a meeting regarding Mr. Hryniak’s purported investment wrote a letter to Cassels Brock and Blackwell LLP warning the firm that Mr. Hryniak’s scheme was a fraud.

While the Court found in favour of the Plaintiffs by recognizing Hryniak’s actions as fraudulent, the Plaintiffs, who have waited more than five years to have their cases heard, are dismayed that the Court did not grant judgment against Mr. Peebles and Cassels Brock and Blackwell LLP, which will now force the Plaintiffs to go through the ordeal of a trial that will cost millions of dollars.  Moreover, the Plaintiffs are concerned that the trial will provide the defendants with further opportunity to use the judicial system to delay a process that was already delayed by the defendants in two drawn-out motions for security for costs.

Andrea Bosco, a representative of Bruno Appliance and Furniture, Inc., one of the Plaintiffs, states:

The Court applied the law unfairly.  More than forty pages of the Court’s 57 page decision was based on Hryniak’s evidence and his obvious fraudulent conduct.  Mr. Hryniak used the offices, lawyers and trust accounts of Cassels Brock, yet the evidence and issues of credibility in respect of Mr. Peebles, such as Mr. Peebles’ signed statement confirming his liability and Mr. Peebles’ insolence and lack of cooperation when examined for discovery, were glossed over by the Court.
The fact is that Mr. Hryniak would have never been able to defraud us if it was not for the legitimacy that Cassels Brock provided to Mr. Hryniak’s conduct and its total disregard for professional standards and rules, especially the law society regulations dealing with the handling of trust funds.
Rather than acknowledging its role in Hryniak’s fraud and correcting the wrong that happened to us and other investors, Cassels Brock is attempting to silence us in the Courts and in the media. For example, one of Canada’s largest distributors of news releases has recently refused to accept press releases from us that reference Cassels Brock.

Despite not granting summary judgment against Mr. Peebles and Cassels Brock and Blackwell LLP, Justice Grace stated his view that “I have little doubt that the presence of a respected partner at a venerable law firm, even at one meeting, created an air of legitimacy, professionalism and integrity which provided some comfort to investors. I am not sure that Mr. Pebbles appreciates that fact even today.”

Javad Heydary, lead counsel for the Plaintiffs, states:

This was a partial victory for our clients and we understand their frustration with a judicial system that took five years to hold Mr. Hryniak accountable for his fraudulent conduct. However, we are confident that when the Court has the opportunity to weigh all of the evidence at trial, including the evidence that was not available on this motion for summary judgment, it will side with our clients and find Cassels Brock and Mr. Peebles liable for our clients’ losses.

Cassels Brock and Blackwell LLP is one of Canada’s oldest and largest law firms headed by Ontario’s former Liberal Premier, The Honourable David R. Peterson.  Moreover, the firm recently retained another former Ontario Premier, The Honourable Mike Harris, who joined the firm as a senior business adviser.

The Plaintiffs comprise one Chicago-based company and 13 elderly American investors, some of whom lost their life savings to Mr. Hryniak’s fraudulent scheme.

For background information on this matter including the recent court decision details (in the form of documents filed with the court), visit: www.brunovcassels.com.  Please note that the allegations contained in the Statement of Claim against Cassels Brock and Blackwell LLP and Gregory Jack Peebles have not yet been proven in a Court of law.

Source: http://newswire.ca/en/releases/archive/November2010/12/c3710.html


The cases are being heard at:
Superior Court of Justice
393 University Avenue
Toronto, Ontario
M5G 1T3


For Further Information:

Javad Heydary or David Alderson, Counsel for the Plaintiffs, Heydary Hamilton PCPhone: 416-972-9001

E-mail: jheydary@heydary.com

Email: dalderson@heydary.com


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.



Bank Liable for Encashment of Forged Cheque

Tuesday, August 3rd, 2010

In reasons by the court released July 12, 2010, the Ontario Court of Appeal held the Bank of Montreal was liable to the plaintiff, a client of the bank, for losses arising from a forged cheque drawn on the clients account with the bank. The court gave effect to s48(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act R.S.C. 1985, cB.4 which provides “where a signature on a bill of exchange is forged, or placed thereon without the authority of the person whose signature it purports to be, the forged or unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative…”

The court upheld the trial judge in finding that the bank’s Verification Clause did not protect the bank, since, construed strictly and in accordance with the doctrine of contra preferentem it did not apply to forged cheques because the honouring of a forged cheque did not constitute an “error, irregularity or omission” within the meaning of those terms as used in the Verification Clause.

Relying on the “objective evidence of the factual matrix underlying the negotiation of the contract” the court interpreted the Verification Clause not to relive the bank for liability for encashment of forged cheques, which is “simply not a bill of exchange that does not conform with the requisite formalities….an invalid cheque for want of proper authorization”

Citation: S.N.S. Industrial Products Limited v Bank of Montreal, 2010 ONCA 500

David Keith Alderson LL.B, LL.M


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Bank’s Duty of Care to Non-Customers

Wednesday, July 28th, 2010

In reasons released July 20, 2010, the Ontario Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge’s order striking out the claim by a non-customer, that the bank, in opening a customers account, owed a duty to non-customers of the bank (such as the appellant): “to ensure that the accounts would not be used for an unlawful purpose” and “to enquire into its customer’s activities because it ought to have known that those activities were suspicious, unusual, or fraudulent in nature”.

The court did not find it necessary to decide whether a bank may ever be found to have a duty to a non-customer in circumstances where it does not have actual knowledge (wilful blindness or recklessness) of the fraudulent activities being conducted through an account of its customer.

The court distinguished the case from Semac Industries Ltd. V 1131426 Ontario Ltd. (2001) 16 B.L.R. (3d) 88 (Ont S.C.) where allegations by a non-customer that the bank had already raised concerns internally about suspicious conduct on the part of its customer, and that the non-customer had subsequently alerted the bank to its allegation of fraud, were allowed to go to trial.

Citation: Dynasty Furniture Manufacturing Ltd. V Toronto-Dominion Bank, 2010 ONCA 514

David Keith Alderson LL.B, LL.M


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