Archive for the ‘Contract Disputes’ Category

Court Refuses to Enjoin Dance Teacher from Competing Against Her Former Employer

Friday, October 7th, 2011

The Plaintiff Ginette Laplante had operated Pascalina’s Dance Studio in Cornwall Ontario since 1992.  The Defendant Jane Hennessy-Craibe had been a student at Pascalina’s from 1993 to 1995.  She became a teacher’s aide with the studio in 1996 and an instructor in 1998.  Her duties as an instructor included choreography, costumes, and selecting hairstyles and make-up for recitals and competitions.

The parties entered into an “employment agreement” in 2008.  This agreement provided that Ms. Hennessy-Craibe was to be paid an hourly wage, and that she was to indemnify Pascalina’s for any actions arising out of her negligence.  It did not include a restrictive covenant or a non-compete clause.

In 2010, the parties had some discussions about the possibility that Ms. Hennessy-Craibe would purchase Ms. Laplante’s studio, but no agreement was reached and in 2011 Ms. Hennessy-Craibe set up her own dance school business in competition with the Plaintiff.

Ms. Laplante sued Ms. Hennessy-Craibe, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, and brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction prohibiting the Defendant from contacting or soliciting any current or former students, instructors, or dance team members from Pascalina’s Dance Studio.

According to the court, key employees such as managers, officers, or directors typically owe a fiduciary duty to their employer.  They may not make unfair use of confidential information acquired during the course of employment in order to solicit clients or misappropriate corporate opportunities.  A key employee is someone who is responsible for guiding the business affairs of the employer.  Key employees are involved in the decision-making process, or have access to confidential information that could impair the employer’s competitiveness if it were disclosed.

In the absence of a restrictive covenant or non-competition clause in an employment agreement, or a fiduciary duty arising from the fact that the employee qualifies as a key employee, a former employee has the right to compete with the employer.  She can use the skills and knowledge acquired in the employer’s service in her new business.

The court concluded that Ms. Hennessy-Craibe’s responsibilities in Ms. Laplante’s business “did not come close to the necessary elements required for a key employee”.  The fact that several students and instructors had followed her to her new business did not of itself constitute proof that the Defendant was a key employee.

Furthermore, the court stated that the contract between the parties, under which the Defendant was paid by the hour and responsible to indemnify the Plaintiff for actions arising out of her activities, would more properly be described as an agreement with an independent contractor, rather than an employment agreement.  The court therefore concluded that the Defendant had failed to meet the first stage of the three-part test for an interlocutory injunction, in that the Plaintiff had not established that there was a serious issue to be tried with respect to liability.

The court also found that the Plaintiff had not established irreparable harm, the second part of the three-part test for an injunction.  If the Plaintiff were to succeed at trial, her losses could be compensated in damages.

With respect to the third part of the three-part test, the balance of convenience, the court was satisfied that the balance of convenience favored the Defendant.  If the injunction was granted, it would prevent the Defendant from operating her business and teaching students who had already registered at her studio.

Finally, the court took note of the fact that the Plaintiff had failed to request a permanent junction in her Statement of Claim.  A claim for a permanent injunction in the Statement of Claim is a prerequisite for granting an interlocutory injunction.  This provided an additional reason for the dismissal of the Plaintiff’s motion.

Link: Laplante v.Hennessy-Craibe, CanLII – 2011 ONSC 5601 (CanLII)

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D.

Insurance and commercial litigation lawyer

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial and other litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

 

Settlement with Individual Class Members in Class Action Lawsuits

Friday, August 19th, 2011

The Superior Court of Justice in 1250264 Ontario Inc. v. Pet Valu Canada Inc. refused to grant Pet Valu’s request for a declaration that agreements entered into between Pet Valu (the franchisor) and individual franchisees releasing Pet Valu of any liability pertaining to claims made in a class-action lawsuit are valid and enforceable.

However, in dismissing Pet Valu’s request, the court did not foreclose such agreements from being made in the future.  In distinguishing a prior Ontario Court decision that held that a class member did not have the right to receive settlement offers and to settle the claims in a class action, the court found that in this case the offers were made to a small fraction of the class and for legitimate business reasons rather than for the purpose of undermining the class action.

Ruzbeh Hosseini, B.Sc., LL.B., J.D.

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial and other litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Home, Cottage and Recreational Property Litigation

Friday, July 22nd, 2011

For many people the most valuable asset they own is their home, cottage or other recreational property.

Heydary Hamilton PC can advise and represent homeowners, cottage owners and other property owners in connection with claims and disputes arising in connection with home, cottage or other residential or recreational property.

Whether such claim or dispute arises in connection with:

  • the design, construction, repair or demolition of property
  • damage to the property
  • fire, smoke, flood, mould or infestation
  • homeowners insurance claims
  • insurance coverage for third party claims
  • injuries occurring on the property, including slip and fall, dog bite and owner or family injuries sustained on the property
  • occupiers’ liability
  • warranty coverage
  • purchase and sale issues
  • alcohol liability and host issues
  • swimming pool claims
  • mortgage, foreclosure and other finance issues
  • easements and licenses
  • ownership disputes
  • partition and sale
  • condominium issues
  • maintenance fees, levies and the like
  • management and operation of the property
  • products liability
  • neighbours, other property owners or associations
  • utilities and suppliers of services
  • trespassers
  • use of the property
  • failure of insurers to defend owners
  • boundary disputes or adverse possession
  • restrictive covenants
  • leasing, sublet or assignment issues
  • tax assessment
  • valuations
  • timeshare issues
  • environmental issues
  • homeowner and cottage owner’s association issues
  • expropriation and eminent domain issues
  • dilapidation and demolition
  • wills and estates issues
  • disputes as to title
  • real estate agents or brokers

Heydary Hamilton PC can provide effective and efficient legal services in connection with home, cottage and recreational properties.

David Alderson, LL.B, LL.M 

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D.

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial and other litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

 

“Dependent Contractor” Gets Six Months Notice of Termination

Wednesday, April 13th, 2011

When an employer terminates an employment contract without cause, the employee is entitled to reasonable notice.  Where the worker is an independent contractor rather than an employee, however, the work relationship can be terminated without notice once the work of the independent contractor has been completed.

The law also recognizes an intermediate category of work relationships which falls short of the degree of direction and control needed to establish an employment contract, but which involves a level of exclusivity that is inconsistent with an independent contractor relationship.  In this situation, the worker is called a “dependent” contractor because his livelihood depends on the company that provides the work.  A dependent contractor, like an employee, is entitled to reasonable notice of termination.

Carmen Sarnelli was a locksmith for 17 years.  He trained with his father, and then took over his father’s business in the year 2000.  About two thirds of Sarnelli’s business came from the defendant Effort Trust Company.  When Effort terminated the relationship at the end of August, 2005, the plaintiff’s business was no longer viable.  He continued to work for a short period of time, but in 2006 he closed his business and sold the inventory.

In a recently released trial decision, Mr. Justice Matheson referred to a series of Canadian cases that recognize the existence of an intermediate situation where an employment relationship does not exist, but where an agreement to terminate the relationship on reasonable notice is nevertheless implied. The permanency of the working relationship between the parties is an important factor in establishing this intermediate category.  A finding of a dependent contractor relationship is more likely where the contractor works exclusively, or with a high level of exclusivity, for a single company.  This element of exclusivity tends to make the contractor economically dependent on the company that provides the work.

Mr. Justice Matheson also referred to five principles that the courts can look to in determining whether or not a dependent contractor relationship exists:

  1. Does the contractor work exclusively for one organization?
  2. Is the contractor subject to the control of a single employer, not only as to the product or services supplied, but also as to when, where, and how products and services are supplied?
  3. Does the contractor have an investment or interest in the tools or equipment required in order to provide his work?
  4. Does the contractor undertake any risk in association with his business, and does he have a corresponding expectation of profit associated with the delivery of his work (as opposed to working for a fixed hourly rate or commission)?
  5. Is the activity of the contractor an integral part of the business organization for which he primarily works?

The judge concluded that Mr. Sarnelli was a dependent contractor.  In making this determination, the judge took note of the fact that Sarnelli was on call at all times, day or night.  Two thirds of his annual billings were for the defendant, so the plaintiff was highly reliant on the defendant.

Another factor that influenced the decision was the fact that Sarnelli had an exclusive distribution contract with the supplier of a particular “high security” lock that Effort Trust preferred to use in some of its buildings.  The witnesses called at trial established that the defendant had no complaints about the plaintiff’s work.  The defendant had seven telephone numbers with which it could reach Sarnelli, indicating a high degree of reliance on him.  Other locksmiths that worked for Effort Trust provided only one or two numbers.

There was also an Effort Trust tradesman list, in which Sarnelli was the only locksmith listed.

The plaintiff had asked for nine months notice.  Since the plaintiff did not seek other customers after the termination, the court concluded that there had been a failure to mitigate, and that six months notice was sufficient.

Under the “dependent contractor” concept, workers who are not employees can still claim compensation if an ongoing contract is terminated without notice or cause.

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D.

Link: Sarnelli v. Effort Trust Company, CanLII – 2011 ONSC 1080 (CanLII)

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Insurance Company Must Defend Parents Against Daughter’s Negligence Claim

Monday, February 14th, 2011

A daughter fell off the balcony of her parents’ home while visiting the family farm.  In a recent decision, the Court of Appeal for Ontario held that at the time of the accident, the daughter was not an “insured” under a farm insurance policy issued to the parents by the Lanark Mutual Insurance Company.  Lanark therefore had a duty to provide the parents with a defence to the negligence action that the daughter had brought against them.

The policy contained a standard clause in which the term “insured” was defined so as to include a relative while “living in the named insured’s household”.  Although a farm insurance policy will typically include liability coverage, these policies do not respond to a liability claim brought by one insured against another.

The judge who heard the duty to defend application found that some eight years before the accident, the daughter was driven from the family home at the age of 15 due to conflicts with her mother, serious religious and lifestyle differences with both parents, and the daughter’s disclosure that her father had been sexually abusing her for some five years.  Since she left home, she had lived what the court described as a “peripatetic existence”.  At the time of the accident, she was visiting the parental home in order to see her brother, who had returned to Canada from overseas, and she had been staying there for two and half weeks before she was injured.

The Court of Appeal stated that the purpose of the policy exclusion was to protect the insurer from collusive claims brought by individuals living together in a close relationship.  The appellate court agreed with the application judge that the term “household” describes a group of people living together in a family-like relationship which includes an element of intimacy or community.

The evidence supported the application judge’s conclusion that the parents did not enjoy that kind of relationship with their daughter, and that she was not “living in the named insured’s household” at the time of the accident.  She had not lived at home since she was either evicted by her parents or chose to leave home following her father’s sexual abuse conviction many years prior to the injury.  Her relationship with her parents had broken down completely when she first left home, she had established her own itinerant lifestyle, and she was not living in her parents’ household at the time of the accident.

It is interesting that the Court Of Appeal based its decision on the purpose of the exclusion clause, identified by the Court as the need to protect the insurance company against collusive claims brought by one family member against another.  Logic and fairness dictate that where the danger of collusion is nonexistent due to the breakdown of the family relationship, the need for the protection afforded to the insurer by the exclusion clause is no longer present.

 

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D.

Link: Tannahill v. Lanark Mutual Insurance Company, 2011 ONCA 123


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Heydary Hamilton Lawyer Wins Motion for Particulars

Friday, February 4th, 2011

On February 4, 20011 Richard Hayles, a commercial litigator with Heydary Hamilton PC, appeared before Master Sproat of the Ontario Superior Court on behalf of a Dutch Manufacturer of horticultural equipment.

The Manufacturer had been sued by a commercial Greenhouse in Ontario, which claimed that equipment it had purchased from the Manufacturer did not function in accordance with certain representations that the Manufacturer and Distributor had made in order to induce the Greenhouse into purchasing the equipment.

The Manufacturer brought a motion seeking particulars of the alleged representations. Specifically,  the Manufacturer challenged numerous paragraphs in the Statement of Claim, and in a set of Answers provided by the Greenhouse to the Manufacturer’s Demand for Particulars, in which the Greenhouse alleged that the representations  had been made “repeatedly”, or “continuously”, over lengthy periods of time (ranging from nine months to  four and a half years).

Mr.  Hayles was able to convince Master Sproat that further particulars of these allegations were required.  In the words of the Master: “…it is my view that the dates of the alleged misrepresentations should and must be provided to meet the high threshold of material fact disclosure and  particularity of a misrepresentation claim.”

The Master was also persuaded that particulars were required of allegations by the Greenhouse to the effect that, after the equipment was installed, the Manufacturer  made repeated promises over extended periods of time to the effect that the Manufacturer and Distributor would fix the problem and make the equipment operational.  This was held to be relevant and required so that the Manufacturer could plead to issues of discoverability and waiver arising out of a limitation period  defence: “There is an added need for particulars in light of the ambiguity as to the relevant limitation period and whether the claim is barred.”

According to the Master, the fact that the Manufacturer had not filed an affidavit stating that the  particulars were not within its knowledge was no bar to the relief sought on a motion: “It is a fundamental tenet of pleading that the defendant be entitled to know case being  pleaded against him.”

In the end, the Master gave an order requiring the particulars requested by the Manufacturer, and ordered the plaintiff Greenhouse to pay over $6000 in costs.

Heydary Hamilton PC


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Interpretation of Commercial Contracts – Valid Termination of a Commercial Lease

Friday, November 26th, 2010

In reasons released November 18, 2010, the Superior Court of Justice in Fairweather Ltd. v. Riocan Yec Holdings Inc., 2010 ONSC 6445 on an application to interpret a commercial lease for a retail store, in particular,  a Lease Amending and Extending Agreement, which included a redevelopment termination clause, which was at the center of the dispute, held that the landlord was entitled  issue the notice of termination and it validly did so.

The reasons of Justice Stinson contained an analysis of the principles applicable to the interpretation of commercial contracts, including the summary of those principles by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Ventas, Inc. v. Sunrise Senior Living Real Estate Investment Trust 2007 ONCA 205 (CanLII), (2007), 85 O.R. (3d) 254 (C.A.), as follows:

“Broadly stated … a commercial contract is to be interpreted,

(a)   as a whole, in a manner that gives meaning to all of its terms and avoids an interpretation that would render one or more of its terms ineffective;

(b)   by determining the intention of the parties in accordance with the language they have used in the written document and based upon the “cardinal presumption” that they have intended what they have said;

(c)     with regard to objective evidence of the factual matrix underlying the negotiation of the contract, but without reference to the subjective intention of the parties; and (to the extent there is any ambiguity in the contract),

(d)     in a fashion that accords with sound commercial principles and good business sense, and that avoids a commercial absurdity. “

In the circumstances, the court held that it was not necessary for the landlord to demonstrate to some level of certainty that it requires the Fairweather premises at a specified time, for a specified purpose, by reason of a specified legal or practical obligation or need.

David Alderson, LL.B, LL.M


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Prenuptial Agreements for Business Partners

Wednesday, November 17th, 2010

When people think of a “prenup”, they think of a contract entered into by individuals intending to marry, and addresses what will happen in the event of a divorce or a breakup of marriage.  However, business partners starting up a new business together should also consider entering into a prenup, otherwise known as a shareholders’ agreement.

A shareholders’ agreement can spell out what will happen to the business should the partnership breaks up.  It will also outline the various rights and obligations available to all shareholders.  At a minimum, such agreements will set out what happens if one shareholder dies or is unable to work, and what happens should one shareholder wishes to exit the business, while the other shareholders do not.

Just like individuals about to get married, individuals starting a business together may not wish to enter into a shareholders’ agreement.  Such entrepreneurs want to focus on creating a successful business, as opposed to focusing on its demise.  As well, individuals who have already worked together may feel that a handshake is enough, and that negotiating a shareholders’ agreement is an indication of a lack of trust by one partner towards the other.  However, it is important for all businesses, regardless of its size, to have a shareholders’ agreement in place.  It is easier to resolve any potential disputes when there is already a mechanism to deal with the problem, then to try to resolve it after it has already escalated.

Source: The Globe and Mail – A Prenup can Spare the Hollywood Drama

Daisy Yu


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.



Deficient Franchise Disclosure Document Basis for Partial Summary Judgment Ruling

Friday, October 8th, 2010

In a motion for partial summary judgment heard on June 22, 2010, the Plaintiffs (franchisees) submitted inter alia that they did not receive a valid disclosure document in accordance with section 5 of the Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000, S.O. 2000 (the “Act”), that they validly rescinded the franchise agreements with the Defendants (franchisors) pursuant to section 6(2) of the Act and in turn that they were entitled to the statutory compensation as provided by the Act.  The Defendants denied that a valid disclosure document was not provided to the Plaintiffs.  In addition or in the alternative, the Defendants argued that the matter involved a resale of an existing franchise by an existing franchisee and since the Defendants were at arms length to the transaction, they ought to be exempt from providing a valid disclosure document.  Further, the Defendants argued that if there was a burden of disclosure, that burden should have been met by the existing franchisee seller.

After reviewing the submissions, Justice Wilson ruled that the purported disclosure document was deficient in several regards, the onus of providing a disclosure document must be borne by the franchisors pursuant to the Act and that the franchise agreements were validly rescinded by the Plaintiffs in accordance to the Act.

In granting partial summary judgment, Justice Wilson ordered that the Defendants were indeed liable to the Plaintiffs for the statutory amounts provided by section 6(6) of the Act.

Citation:  2189205 Ontario Inc. et al. v. Springdale Pizza Depot Ltd. et al.

http://www.canlii.org/en/on/onsc/doc/2010/2010onsc3695/2010onsc3695.pdf

Arthur Wishart Act (Franchise Disclosure), 2000, S.O. 2000
http://www.canlii.org/en/on/laws/stat/so-2000-c-3/latest/so-2000-c-3.html

C. Donald Brown


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.


International Sale of Goods Convention – New Members in 2010 and 2011

Thursday, October 7th, 2010

The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”) establishes a comprehensive code of legal rules governing:

  • the formation of contracts for the international sale of goods
  • the obligations of the buyer and seller in contracts for the international sale of goods
  • remedies for breach of contracts for the international sale of goods
  • other aspects of the contracts for the international sale of goods

Upon accession, Canada declared that, in accordance with article 93 of the Convention, the Convention would extend to Ontario (and other provinces named in the declaration).

The Canadian International Sale of Goods Contracts Convention Act, S.C. 1991, c. 13, has been in effect in Ontario since 1992 because of the International Sale of Goods Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. I.10.  These two acts brought into effect in Canada the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods.

In 2010, Albania and Armenia became members of CISG.

In 2011, CISG will enter in force for Turkey and Dominican Republic.

The Ontario International Sale of Goods Act provides that the contracting parties “may exclude its application by expressly providing in the contract that the local domestic law of Ontario or another jurisdiction applies to it or that the Convention does not apply to it”.

David Alderson, LL.B, LL.M (Lond.)

Masha Loftus, M.A., J.D.


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.