Archive for the ‘Carriage of Goods (Air, Sea, Road, Rail)’ Category

Federal Court of Appeal Upholds Federal Court Decision Granting Anti-Suit Injunction for Release of Vessel from Second Arrest

Tuesday, August 16th, 2011

In a previous blog posting on the Heydary Hamilton PC Blog Release of Arrest of Ship in Belgium stayed pending Appeal to Canadian Federal Court of Appeal which commented on  the decision of the Federal Court of Appeal in Alpha Trading Monaco Sam v The Ship “Sarah Degagnes” et al 2010 FCA 209 to grant a stay  of execution from the order of the Federal Court (made on a request for an anti-suit interlocutory injunction) that the appellant cause the release of the vessel “Sarah Desgagnes” from conservatory arrest in Belgium, where it is being held to secure the appellant’s claim in proceedings in Italy against the vessel’s subtime charterer  for unpaid bunkering invoices.

The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal of the order of the Federal Court on the appellants anti-suit interlocutory injunction that the appellant cause the release of the vessel “Sarah Desgagnes” from conservatory arrest in Belgium.  The appeal decision is reported at  Alpha Trading Monaco Sam v The Ship “Sarah Degagnes” et al 2011 FCA 41. In the reasons delivered from the Bench by Nadon J.A. the court reasoned that they ought not to interfere with the decision of the Federal Court “Given that the arrest [of the ship in Montreal] the respondents undertook to submit themselves and their ship to the jurisdiction of the Federal Court and to provide security for the appellant’s claims, and given that the re-arrest of their ship by the appellant in Belgium on May 4, 2010, in the particular circumstances of the case, clearly constitutes an attempt on the part of the appellant to take unfair advantage of the respondents by forcing them to provide security against a third party…”

David Alderson LL.B, LL.M (Lond.)

Practicing in Ontario (Canada)

Admitted (but not now practicing) in New York State, England and Wales, and Bermuda

Practiced in Dubai, UAE

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial and other litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Freight Forwarder refuses Shipper’s Request to Amend Bill of Lading

Thursday, March 3rd, 2011

The Federal Court of Canada granted the plaintiff, freight forwarder, in Kuehne + Nagel v Agrimax Ltd. 2010 FC 1303 summary judgment for freight paid on behalf of the defendant and for sum they were liable to pay in demurrage. 

The Honourable Justice Harrington of the Federal Court of Canada said “Agrimax Ltd. refuses to pay Kuehne + Nagels’s account because it did the right thing. It refused to issue a fraudulent bill of lading”. 

The court held that pursuant to its contract with Agrimax, the plaintiff made arrangements with Blue Anchor Line for the shipment of 22 containers of crude sulphur to be received at Irricana, Alberta, for pre-carriage by truck and rail to Vancouver where the cargo was to be loaded on board the OOCL Kuala Lumpur for carriage to and discharge at Haldia, India. 

The bill of lading issued by the plaintiff, as agents for Blue Anchor Line, was dated at Calgary on 25 August 2008. The cargo is said to have been “received for shipment in apparent good order and condition” at Irricana and shipped on board OOCL Kuala Lumpur on September 4, 2008. 

The purchaser’s bank refused to take up the bills of lading and refused to honour the letter of credit on the grounds that the shipment was to have commenced by 31 August 2008.  Agrimax requested that the bill of lading be altered to remove the date on which the cargo had been shipped on board the OOCL Kuala Lumpur, wanting the “erroneous date of September 4, 2008” to be removed and called for an “on board bill”. 

In its analysis the trial judge described that a bill of lading contains various representation on behalf of the carrier, including the date when the cargo was “received for shipment” or “shipped” on board, as the case may be.  

Under the Hague-Visby Rules, Schedule 1 to the Marine Liability Act, a shipper may simply demand a “received for shipment” bill of lading, and irrespective of whether or not it demanded a “received for shipment” bill of lading, it may also demand a “shipped” bill of lading, once the cargo is loaded on board the carrying ship.

In this case, Agrimax Ltd. demanded, after the fact, an amendment to the bill of lading so that the date the cargo was taken on board the OOCL Kuala Lumpur would not appear. The court held that the plaintiff was absolutely right in its refusal to amend the bill of lading. 

In passing, the trial judge noted that “some carriers have, at their folly, issued such documents against letter of credit”, but such letters of indemnity are unenforceable under both English and Canadian law. 

David Keith Alderson LL.B, LL.M (Lond.)

 

Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Who Owns the River Beds?

Wednesday, March 2nd, 2011


The question of fact whether the Wye River, which meanders through property of the applicants in Simpson v Ontario (Natural Resources), 2011 ONSC 1168, was navigable, and the question of fact whether there had been an express grant of the river bed, were heard and determined de novo by the Superior Court of Justice on an appeal under the Land Titles Act of the decision of the Deputy Director of Titles, which upheld Ontario Ministry of Natural Resources’ objection to the applicants’ application to be registered as owners of lands including the river bed.

 

The factual issues arose on consideration of section 1 of the Ontario Beds of Navigable Waters Act which provides “where land borders on a navigable body of water or stream, or on which the whole or a part of a navigable body or water or stream is situate, or through which a navigable body or water or stream flows, has been or is granted by the Crown, it shall be deemed, in the absence of an express grant of it, that the bed of such body of water was not intended to pass and did not pass to the grantee”.

 

The parties agreed that the onus is on Ontario to prove that the waterway was navigable as at the date of the patent, which was, for this land, 1836.

 

In his reasons the Honourable Justice Eberhard reviewed the jurisprudence about the meaning of “navigable” in determining “proprietary rights in the bed or solum”, including Coleman v Ontario [1983] O.J. No 275 and Canoe Ontario v Reed 69 O.R. (2d) 494, [1989] O.J. No. 1293 and quoted extensively from Coleman for the history and context of the navigability question, including these principles:

 

The common law in England distinguishes between tidal waters, which are navigable and accessible to the public for passage over the surface, the ownership of the beds being vested in the Crown; and inland waters (i.e. non-tidal) in which case a grant by the Crown to a riparian owner automatically coveys to him the bed of the inland water adjacent to the lands conveyed while the public right of navigation is preserved.

 

Previous case law holding that the Great Lakes and the Winnipeg River to be inland waters as to which a riparian owner was prima facie presumed to have title to the solum has now been modified by the Beds of Navigable Waters Act.

 

The principles emerging from the cases are:

  1. A stream, to be navigable in law, must be navigable in fact. That is, it must be capable in its natural state of being traversed by large or small craft of some sort, as small as canoes, skiffs and rafts drawing less than a foot of water;
  2. “Navigable” also means “floatable” in the sense that the river or stream is used or is capable of use to float logs, log-rafts and booms;
  3. A river or stream may be navigable over part or its course and not navigable over other parts;
  4. To be navigable in law a river or stream need not in fact be used for navigation so long as realistically it is capable of being so used;
  5. It need not be navigable for commercial purposes;
  6. The underlying concept of navigability in law is that the river or stream is a public aqueous highway used or capable of use by the public;
  7. Navigation need not be continuous but may fluctuate seasonally;
  8. Interruptions to navigation such as rapids on an otherwise navigable stream which may, by improvements such as canals be readily circumvented, do not render the river or stream non navigable;
  9. A stream not navigable in its natural state may become so as a result of artificial improvements
  10. While commercial utility is not a sine qua non to navigability, evidence of commercial use will be determinative of the question.

If use is regular and has practical values, then seasonable limitations, or limits on the type or nature of the public utility do not remove the waterway from the public domain.

 

In reviewing Canoe Ontario, Doherty J. found that the public right of passage does not carry with it a public right or portage and if natural obstruction temporarily or permanently prevents passage, the right of public passage remains although it may not be exercisable.

 

The court found that the Wye River was capable of supporting such activity as canoe use and log floating (without actually finding that such use actually occurred) and thus the passage running through the subject land was navigable, and since it found no express grant, the applicant could not claim ownership of the river bed.  The appeal and application were dismissed.


David Alderson, LL.B, LL.M  

 

 Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

   

Ontario Court Has No Jurisdiction over Personal Injury Case under Warsaw Convention

Monday, November 15th, 2010

The Superior Court of Justice of Ontario in its judgment released on November 5, 2010, in Balani v. Lufthansa, 2010 ONSC 3003 (CanLII) decided that the Court has no jurisdiction over the plaintiffs’ action against the defendant, a German airline company, under the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air (“Warsaw Convention”).

The plaintiffs, a couple, were travelling on round trip tickets they purchased from the defendant through a travel agent in India. The plaintiffs alleged that the wife was obliged to walk from the aircraft because the defendant failed to arrange a wheelchair upon the plaintiffs’ request. When the wife came to an escalator in the terminal, she had a fall and suffered permanent and serious injury.

The Court found that the plaintiffs’ claim is governed by Article 17 of the Warsaw Convention. In making such a finding, the court firstly followed the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Olympic Airways v. Husain, 540 U.S. 644 (2004), which stated that “inaction by the carrier could constitute an ‘accident’ within the meaning of Article 17”. Secondly, the Court refused to apply the Day test, which was relied upon by the plaintiffs, and found it clear that the claim comes within the meaning of Article 17 given the place of the alleged injury causing accident and the defendant’s failure to provide the wheelchair.

The Court further decided that it has no jurisdiction under the Warsaw Convention because Canada and Ontario don’t satisfy any of the following four criteria under Article 28: 1) the defendant carrier is ordinarily resident in Germany; 2) the defendant’s principal place of business is in Germany; 3) the contract was made in India; and 4) the place of destination is India.

David Alderson, LL.B, LL.M (Lond.)

Masha Loftus, M.A., J.D


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.

Warsaw Convention Limitation Period Is No Hurdle in Air France Case

Tuesday, November 2nd, 2010

In another decision arising out of litigation over the August 2, 2005 Air France accident at Pearson International Airport, the Ontario Court of Appeal was called upon to interpret the limitation provision contained in article 29 of the Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Carriage by Air, 12 October 1929, 137 L.N.T.S. 11 (the “Warsaw Convention”).  The Warsaw Convention, which is implemented in Canada by the Carriage by Air Act, R.S. 1985, c. C – 26, governs liability for the international carriage of persons and goods by air.  Under Article 29 the Convention, “The right to damages shall be extinguished if action is not brought within two years, reckoned from the date of arrival at the destination….”


The plaintiffs sought damages from Air France and others for the destruction of documents that were being shipped on the Air France jet when it overran the runway during a thunderstorm and caught fire.  Their notice of action was issued within the two year limitation period.  The plaintiffs did not serve the claim on one of the defendants within the six month period for service provided under the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure, however, so they had to move for an order extending the time for service.  After being served, the defendant brought a motion before the Master for reconsideration.  That motion was dismissed, and an appeal to the Divisional Court was also dismissed.

In the Court of Appeal, the defendant argued that the order granting an extension of time for service was improper because the statement of claim had expired due to the failure to effect service within the six months.  In common law jurisdictions, expiration of a limitation period does not extinguish the underlying claim; rather, it raises a procedural bar that prevents the plaintiff from proceeding with the claim.  The defendant argued that the two year limitation period provided by Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention was fundamentally different in character in that after two years, applying the language of Article 29, the right to damages is “extinguished”.  It follows therefore, that when the six-month period for service passed, the statement of claim expired, and there was nothing for the court to revive.

In the view of the Ontario Court of Appeal, however, once the claim has been issued within the two year limitation period, the requirements of Article 29 of the Warsaw Convention have been satisfied.  Since Article 28 the Convention provides that procedural matters are to be governed by the law of the court that is seized of the particular case, any subsequent procedural issues, including those involving time for service, are governed by the Ontario Rules of Civil Procedure. Case law interpreting those Rules has clearly established that the statement of claim remains extant after expiry of the time for service, and it can therefore be served if an order extending the time is granted.

Link: Mosregion Investments Corporation v. Ukraine International Airlines, 2010 ONCA 715

Richard Hayles, B.A., J.D.


Brief informational summaries about commercial litigation matters in the courts of Ontario and other developments are periodically published on this website. They are intended to be a general comment or general discussion, not legal advice and should not be relied upon as legal advice. Should you require legal advice, please contact info@heydary.com or 416 972 9001.